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(Im)Perfect Regulation: Virtual Currency and
Other Digital Assets as Collateral
Kristin N. Johnson*
Sarah E. Hsu Wilbur**
Stanley Sater***
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, virtual currencies have captured an increasingly
significant role in financial markets, introducing a new class of assets and
revolutionizing market notions of issuing, storing, and transferring value.1
Even social media platforms have announced intentions to enter the market;
Facebook anticipates launching Libra, a new digital currency that will be
globally recognized as legal tender.2 The underlying technology—
blockchain3—has transformed capital and credit markets, creating a digital
pathway that expands opportunities for raising capital4 and collateralizing
debt obligations. This pathway has enabled financial arrangements in which
market participants transfer significant volumes of funds, raise nearly $17
billion in capital or borrow from lenders, and offer virtual currency as collateral to secure their promises to repay debt obligations.5
*

Kristin N. Johnson is the McGlinchey Stafford Professor of Law, Associate
Dean for Faculty Research, and the Gordon Gamm Faculty Scholar at Tulane
University Law School.
** Sarah is a Litigation Associate at Morgan, Lewis, Bockius LLP.
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1.

For a description of the varieties of virtual currencies that exist as of the writing
of this article, and virtual currency exchanges and service platforms that currently exist worldwide, see All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP (Dec. 21,
2018), https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/; Cryptocurrency Exchanges /
Markets List, CRYPTOCOINCHARTS (Dec. 21, 2018), https://cryptocoincharts
.info/markets/info.

2.

AnnaMarie Andriotis et al., Facebook Building Cryptocurrency-Based Payments System, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/face
book-building-cryptocurrency-based-payments-system-11556837547.

3.

See infra Part I.

4.

ICO Tracker, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker.

5.

A growing literature explores questions at the intersection of innovative developments in blockchain technology and regulation. See, e.g., Carla L. Reyes,
Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384 (2017); Kevin Werback &
Nicolas Corness, Contracts Ex Machnia, 67 DUKE L.J. 313 (2017); Robinson
Randolph, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin
Offerings 85 TENN. L. REV. 897 (2018), https://tennesseelawreviewdotcom
.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/5-robinson-macros-working-copy-v.3.pdf; Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets (Oct. 4, 2017), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048104.
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Collateral is a foundational concept in secured lending arrangements.
The application of innovative technology—blockchain and virtual currencies
developed on this protocol—to collateralized debt transactions reveal the
deep tensions that arise when new asset classes challenge static regulatory
approaches.
A flurry of white papers published in the 1990s promised a design protocol for a trustless, peer-to-peer network for digital assets that would decentralize and democratize financial markets.6 Early reports were consistent with
virtual currency enthusiasts’ expectations: the trading price of Bitcoin—a
preeminent virtual currency—rose from approximately $13 in 20137 to a
staggering $19,205 in December of 2017.8 Reports indicate that market participants engage in nearly 9,000 Bitcoin transactions every hour.9 Markets
6.

See, e.g., DAVID CHAUM, BLIND SIGNATURES FOR UNTRACEABLE PAYMENTS
(1998), http://sceweb.sce.uhcl.edu/yang/teaching/csci5234WebSecurityFall
2011/Chaum-blind-signatures.pdf; STEFAN BRANDS, UNTRACEABLE OFF-LINE
CASH IN WALLET WITH OBSERVERS (1993), https://link.springer.com/content/
pdf/10.1007%2F3-540-48329-2_26.pdf; TATSUAKI OKAMOTO & KAZUO OHTA,
UNIVERSAL ELECTRONIC CASH (1992), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/
10.1007%2F3-540-46766-1_27.pdf; DAVID CHAUM, ET AL., UNTRACEABLE
ELECTRONIC CASH (1990), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F0387-34799-2_25.pdf.

7.

Bitcoin Price, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/charts?locale=en-US (To
display 2013 in URL, change date to “All”) (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).

8.

Id. (stating that in 2017 alone, the price of bitcoin climbed from below $1,000
to over $19,000); see Stan Higgins, From $900 to $20,000: Bitcoin’s Historic
2017 Price Run Revisited, COINDESK (Dec. 30, 2017, 13:30 UTC), https://www
.coindesk.com/900-20000-bitcoins-historic-2017-price-run-revisited/; see also
Bitcoin’s Price Swings Wildly, Touching Above $19,000, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2017, 10:55 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-bitcoin-20171207story.html (“Around 10:40 a.m. Pacific Time, one bitcoin was valued at
$15,872, according to Coinbase; it briefly surged above $19,000 earlier in the
day. Last week, the price of a bitcoin topped $10,000 for the first time. At the
start of the year, it was worth less than $1,000.”); Chaotic Trading Marks New
Surge in Bitcoin Price, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/
3136ca5e-db78-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482 (“Bitcoin prices on its biggest exchanges diverged wildly on Thursday in a session that sharply exposed the
fragile trading infrastructure for the nascent cryptocurrency. In one wild 20minute period, the price of bitcoin soared $2,000 per coin to more than
$19,000.”).

9.

Cryptocurrency Statistics, BITINFOCHARTS, https://bitinfocharts.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019); see Kai Sedgwick, Bitcoin by Numbers: 21 Statistics That
Reveal Growing Demand for the Cryptocurrency, BITCOIN.COM NEWS (Nov.
11, 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/bitcoin-numbers-21-statistics-reveal-growing-demand-cryptocurrency/; see also Juliane Friedrich, Blockchain—What is
the Hype All About?, VDMA (Aug. 25, 2017), https://foerd.vdma.org/en/
viewer/-/v2article/render/19962123 (quoting Dr. Johannes Hinckeldey, “Today
Bitcoin allows for 7 transactions per second and 1,000 to 2,000 transactions per

2018]

(Im)Perfect Regulation

117

have observed an undeniable increase in the use, demand, and price of virtual
currency.10
As the diversity and number of virtual currencies expands exponentially, some coins, altcoins, stable coins, and various tokens have garnered
greater popularity than others.11 The number and diversity of investors in this
asset class has quickly increased.12
block. Although this has changed since segmentation at the start of August
[2017], it is still on a very low level. In other words, about 6 blocks are possible per hour or 9,000 transactions per hour—worldwide . . . .”); How Does
Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works (last visited Feb.
5, 2019) (“A transaction is a transfer of value between Bitcoin wallets that gets
included in the block chain.”).
10. See Sedgwick, supra note 9; see also Evelyn Cheng, Bitcoin Exchange
Coinbase Has More Users Than Stock Brokerage Schwab, CNBC (Nov. 27,
2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/27/bitcoin-exchange-coinbase-hasmore-users-than-stock-brokerage-schwab.html (“The operator of the largest
U.S.-based bitcoin exchange has more users than brokerage Charles
Schwab. . . . Schwab reported in mid-November it had 10.6 million active
brokerage accounts in October, up 5 percent from the same period last year. In
contrast, Coinbase had 11.7 million users at the end of October . . . That’s up
148 percent from 4.7 million a year ago. Through Sunday, that number had
grown to 13.3 million.”); Joseph Young, Exponential Growth: Number of
Bitcoin Users to Reach 200 Million by 2024, CCN (Dec. 9, 2017, 20:44),
https://www.ccn.com/exponential-growth-number-bitcoin-users-reach-200-million-2024/ (“According to RT, analysts expect the number of bitcoin users to
reach 200 million by 2024, within the next seven years, given the current exponential growth rate of bitcoin . . . . A Cambridge study conducted by Dr. Garrick Hileman and Michel Rauchs in March 2017 revealed that the number of
active users of bitcoin wallets was in the range of 2.9 million and 5.8 million.
However, since then, proportional to the market valuation and price of bitcoin,
the cryptocurrency’s user base has grown at a rapid rate. Coinbase alone, the
global market’s largest bitcoin brokerage and wallet platform, serves more than
13 million active users.”); The Cryptocurrency Market is Growing Exponentially, MIT TECH. REV. (May 29, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
607947/the-cryptocurrency-market-is-growing-exponentially/.
11. See Scott D. Hughes, Cryptocurrency Regulations and Enforcement in the U.S.,
45 W. ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (2017); Chloe Cornish, Growing Number of Cryptocurrencies Spark Concerns, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/
a6b90a8c-f4b7-11e7-8715-e94187b3017e. We recognize that a variety of virtual currencies exist. Some of these serve as an alternative form of cash (though
they are not issued by a sovereign government). Throughout this Article, we
will use the term “virtual currency” to refer to all the different types of virtual
currencies including coins, altcoins, and tokens.
12. Jag Jassel, Difference Between Bitcoin vs Ethereum vs Litecoin vs Ripple, MEDIUM (May 7, 2018), https://medium.com/@jag.jassel/difference-between-bit
coin-vs-ethereum-vs-litecoin-vs-ripple-a61d4f2ef7c4 (describing the differences between these virtual currencies).
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Analysts estimate that millions of individuals and institutions around the
world own virtual currencies.13 Predictions indicate that more than 200 million individuals and institutions will hold virtual currencies in their digital
wallets by 2024.14
Conventional banking, securities, and commodities markets have already witnessed a deluge of origination and trading activity in virtual currency markets.15 Recently, commentators report a marked uptick in hedge

13. See Alex Lielacher, How Many People Use Bitcoin? Updated for 2018,
BITCOIN MKT. J. (Jan. 18, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal
.com/how-many-people-use-bitcoin/ (“Currently, there are almost 28.5 million
bitcoin wallets that hold more than 0.001 BTC . . . . However, most bitcoin
users have several bitcoin wallets and use multiple wallet addresses to increase
their financial privacy when transacting in bitcoin. Hence, the number of
bitcoin users is likely less than 28.5 million. The most popular bitcoin wallet
and exchange provider internationally, Coinbase, reportedly has over 13 million users, which would suggest that the number of bitcoin users is somewhere
between 13 million and 28.5 million. Given that Coinbase is available in 32
countries and that it has emerged as the go-to bitcoin wallet for newcomers, its
user base number gives a better indication of how many users there are than
purely analyzing wallet addresses. Having said that, among the countries that
are not serviced by Coinbase are some of the largest bitcoin economies such as
China, South Korea, and Japan. Additionally, no bitcoin users in South
America or Africa can use the company’s service. Given the growing number
of bitcoin users in Asia, Africa, and South America who are using other wallet
providers, the number of bitcoin users has to be much higher than Coinbase’s
13 million.”); cf. Garrick Hileman & Michel Rauchs, Global Cryptocurrency
Benchmarking Study, (2017), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_up
load/research/centres/alternative-finance/downloads/2017-04-20-global-crypto
currency-benchmarking-study.pdf (“The estimated number of unique active
users of cryptocurrency wallets has grown significantly since 2013 to between
2.9 million and 5.8 million today . . . . The total number of wallets can be
estimated using data collected from study participants as well as including the
number of software downloads of major wallet providers and Bitcoin’s reference implementation. It is estimated that the total number of wallets has increased more than 4x from 8.2 million in 2013 to nearly 35 million in 2016.”).
14. See Young, supra note 10. While there are many Bitcoin holders, commentators acknowledge that fewer than 1,000 people own 40% of the Bitcoin market.
Olga Kharif, The Bitcoin Whales: 1,000 People Who Own 40 Percent of the
Market, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-08/the-bitcoin-whales-1-000-people-who-own-40-percent-of-themarket. In addition, 96% of Bitcoin is owned by just 4% of Bitcoin addresses.
Sedgwick, supra note 9.
15.

See Young, supra note 10 (“The listing of bitcoin futures by CBOE and CME
in [December 2017] will drive adoption of bitcoin in the traditional finance
market, amongst large-scale institutional investors, retail traders, hedge funds,
and investment firms.”).
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fund investments in virtual currency markets.16 In the coming decade, analysts predict that institutional investors will acquire tens of billions of dollars
of virtual currency; retail investors and individual consumers are already
flooding the initial coin offering (ICO) market.17 Parallel trends appear to
characterize credit markets.18 Virtual currencies are often closely-held by
small groups that typically maintain a controlling interest in a specific currency, which is often accomplished by investing a significant portion of their
individual wealth in a single currency.19
To invest or leverage the value of their digital assets, virtual currency
holders face an inefficient two-step process.20 To capture its benefits, virtual
currency holders must often exchange their digital assets for governmentissued currency or a more liquid asset class. This first step—exchanging or
liquidating virtual currency—may create market price risks, conversion
costs, and tax consequences.21 Virtual currency holders increasingly seek creative, more efficient, and less risky paths to leverage digital assets. Accord16. See, e.g., Evelyn Cheng, There Are Now More Than 120 Hedge Funds Focused
Solely on Bitcoin, Digital Currencies, CNBC (Oct. 27, 2017, 4:39 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2017/10/27/there-are-now-more-than-120-hedge-funds-focused-solely-on-bitcoin.html (“More than 90 [hedge] funds focused on digital
assets like bitcoin have launched [in 2017], bringing the total number of such
‘crypto-funds’ to 124, according to financial research firm Autonomous Next
. . . . Total assets under management by crypto-funds now stands at $2.3
billion.”).
17. Young, supra note 10.
18. See, e.g., Olga Kharif, These Guys Want to Lend You Money Against Your
Bitcoin, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-12-14/bitcoin-s-new-barons-no-longer-have-to-sell-to-livein-luxury; Josiah Wilmoth, You Can Now Use Bitcoin as Collateral When Applying for a Personal Loan, STRATEGIC COIN (Dec. 2, 2017), https://strategiccoin.com/bitcoin-collateral-personal-loan/ (“The cryptocurrency markets have
experienced unprecedented growth in 2017, and many bitcoin investors have
accumulated significant wealth. However, many of these investors believe that
the bitcoin price continues to have significant long-term potential, so they are
reluctant to sell their holdings for cash when they need liquidity. Financial
services firm Unchained Capital aims to fill this voId. Earlier this week, the
lending startup began offering bitcoin-secured loans to the U.S. public.”); Will
Yakowicz, Bitcoin Millionaires Have a New Way to Cash Out Without Ever
Selling a Single Bitcoin, INC. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.inc.com/willyakowicz/loan-startups-accept-cryptocurrency-collateral.html (“Over the past
year, a half a dozen new loan platforms including Salt Lending, Sweetbridge,
MoneyToken, and EthLend have emerged with the sole purpose of giving
crypto traders the ability to get a cash loan secured by cryptocurrencies as
collateral.”).
19. See Kharif, The Bitcoin Whales, supra note 14.
20. See infra text accompanying note 60.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 60, 234.

120

SMU Science and Technology Law Review

[Vol. XXI

ing to one commentator, the market for loans secured by virtual currency will
reach tens of billions of dollars within the next decade.22 As financial markets increasingly embrace digital transactions, commentators query whether
existing regulation effectively applies to lending arrangements secured by
virtual currency.23
Secured lending arrangements are generally understood to be a matter of
state law. With only slight variations, all fifty states have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).24 The U.C.C. is a set of regulations that
creates a recording system enabling lenders to record a claim or interest in
real property through a registry located in the county of the state where the
property is located.25 Article 9 of the U.C.C. establishes the requirements for
perfecting a security interest in real property.26 A perfected security interest
enables lenders to establish priority with respect to their claims in real property and to ensure that subsequently established claims will be deemed
subordinate.27
Secured lending offers an attractive pathway to exploit the promised
benefits of virtual currency while mitigating the inherent limitations and design-based risks of this asset class.28 Financial technology (fintech) firms operating in digital asset markets have seized the opportunity to act as
intermediaries by initiating business models that lend cash in exchange for
virtual currency.29 The loans facilitate purchasing tangible goods, such as
22. See Kharif, These Guys Want to Lend You Money, supra note 18.
23. See infra Part II.
24. Bob Lawless, Is U.C.C. Article 9 the Achilles Heel of Bitcoin?, CREDIT SLIPS
BLOG (Mar. 10, 2014, 8:17 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/
03/is-ucc-article-9-the-achilles-heel-of-bitcoin.html).
25.

See id.; see also infra Part II.

26.

See infra Part II.

27.

See infra Part II.

28.

See Asset Backed Lending, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/a/assetbasedlending.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). A variety of financial
firms engage in secured lending activities. Id. Typically, borrowers who enter
into secured lending arrangements seek to leverage illiquid assets, converting
an asset that is difficult to sell or subject to high transaction costs into cash or
credit. Id. In exchange for a distribution of cash, the borrower agrees to repay
the principal (cash borrowed) at specified intervals for a stated price (the interest rate), which may be fixed or fluctuate. Id. The material payment terms,
namely the interest, may vary based on the negotiations between the borrower
and lender, the borrower’s creditworthiness (history and reputation for timely
satisfaction of previous debt obligations), and whether the borrower offers collateral to secure her debt. Id.

29. Kharif, These Guys Want to Lend You Money, supra note 18; see, e.g., Vanessa
Salt, What is SALT Lending?, SALT LENDING (May 2018), https://saltlending
.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/115009157387-What-is-SALT-Lending-; see
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cars or houses, and portfolio diversification by investing across asset classes
to diversify financial investments.30
As the market for virtual currency-secured loans aggressively expands,
commentators, regulators, and scholars have expressed concerns. In conventional lending arrangements, a borrower and lender enter into a security
agreement that identifies the collateral that will be transferred to the lender if
a borrower fails to repay a debt obligation. As noted above, Article 9 of the
U.C.C. governs these lending arrangements.31 The U.C.C. establishes the
process for perfecting security interests in the designated collateral.32 Under
Article 9, the process for establishing perfection varies based on the type of
real property that serves as collateral.33 In some instances, such as loans secured by rights to intellectual property, a secured lender perfects a security
interest in the collateral by filing a financing statement.34 A scrivener’s error
in the recording of the description of the collateral or failure to precisely
follow the perfection process may jeopardize the secured lender’s right or
priority in the event that a borrower defaults on payment obligations.35 In
order to perfect a security interest in other forms of collateral, such as money,
a secured lender can possess the collateral.
Attempts to apply Article 9 to virtual currency engender myriad concerns that one might describe as the “perfection problem.” First, the express
language of Article 9 does not indicate that the regulatory framework applies
to virtual currencies. Article 9 outlines a detailed list of assets that may serve
as collateral. Some of the most commonly designated forms of collateral include investment property, money, securities, commodities, and deposit ac-

also Dan Caplinger, Why Bitcoin Loans Are About to Explode, MOTLEY FOOL
(Dec. 17, 2017, 7:38 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/12/17/whybitcoin-loans-are-about-to-explode.aspx (“Having seen more retailers willing to
accept bitcoin, supporters of the virtual currency are now turning their attention
to a key traditional banking function: lending using bitcoin as collateral. Major
banks haven’t yet stepped up to the plate pitching bitcoin loans as a growth
driver, but smaller niche institutions have popped up to explore the cutting
edge of crypto-financing. There are two reasons bitcoin loans are about to become the next big thing with investors in the digital currency . . . 1. Bitcoin
owners need a tax-friendly exit strategy . . . [and] 2. Bitcoin lenders can now
hedge their risk.”).
30. See Yakowicz, supra note 18.
31. See Lawless, supra note 24.
32. Lawless, supra note 24.
33. U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(3).
34. Stephen Fishman, How to Attach and Perfect a Security Interest Under the
UCC, NOLO.COM (May 2013), https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/howattach-perfect-security-interest-under-the-ucc.html.
35.

Id.
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counts. Collateral assets that do not fall into Article 9’s enumerated asset
categories are classified as “general intangibles.”36
In October 2017, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) introduced the
Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act (URVCBA), a statutory framework for the regulation of companies engaging in “virtual-currency business activity,” such as (1) exchanging, transferring, or storing
virtual currency; (2) holding electronic precious metals or certificates of electronic precious metals; or (3) exchanging digital representations of value
within online games for virtual currency or legal tender.37 The URVCBA’s
unique, three-tiered structure clarifies whether an individual or company engaging in virtual-currency business activity is exempt from the act, must register, or must obtain a license.38 The URVCBA also contains numerous
consumer protections.
In March 2019, the ULC requested that states considering enacting the
URVCBA or competing legislation await a study committee report.39 The
ULC and American Law Institute commissioned the joint committee to write
the study because emerging concerns suggested that the URVCBA did not
adequately address competing regulators concerns and failed to establish that
amendments to the UCC were needed to accommodate digital technology.40
Curiously, several states, including California, Hawaii, Nevada, and
Oklahoma had already began moving legislation based on the URVCBA and
a supplemental act.41 Adding to the confusion regarding the ULC’s initial

36. See infra Part II.
37. Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N
(Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?
CommunityKey=e104aaa8-c10f-45a7-a34a-0423c2106778.
38. Id.
39. Uniform Commercial Code and Emerging Technologies, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=
afffb337-d599-4456-9436-a52aa5d9dcc2 (last visited July 8, 2019).
40. Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N
25–27, 39–40 (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/commu
nity-home?CommunityKey=e104aaa8-c10f-45a7-a34a-0423c2106778.
41. See Edwin Smith, The Uniform Commercial Code and Digital Assets: Legislative Initiatives, UNIF. L. COMM’N (Mar. 13, 2019, 3:07 PM), https://www
.uniformlaws.org/blogs/edwin-smith/2019/03/13/ucc-and-digital-assets-legislative-initiatives; Caitlin Long, Seismic News About State Virtual Currency
Laws: ULC Urges States to Withdraw Model Act, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/caitlinlong/2019/03/25/seismic-news-about-statevirtual-currency-laws-ulc-urges-states-to-withdraw-model-act/#729689045fda
(Rhode Island’s General Assembly has initiated legislation to adopt the
URVCBA).
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approach, two other states have rejected both approaches and elected to craft
their own regulatory approach.42
The debate regarding the application of Article 9 parallels similar discussions in the regulation of initial coin offerings in capital markets.43 The
absence of a reference to virtual currency in Article 9 may not, however, be
determinative. Congress, courts, and regulators have interpreted the enumerated terms to enable dynamic application of federal securities laws.
It is hardly a surprise that virtual currencies do not appear in Article 9.
Quite simply, the drafters of the most recent amendments of the U.C.C. did
not envision lending arrangements secured by virtual currency. The absence
of a reference to virtual currency in Article 9 may not, however, be critical.
For many years, courts, regulators, and market participants have interpreted
the language of the U.C.C. to encompass not only the enumerated assets but
arrangements with economic realities that are similar to the enumerated asset
classes.44 Regulators and commentators posit that the U.C.C.’s scheme is
elastic and its existing language may capture innovative digital assets.45 Perhaps, some argue, digital assets are simply derivatives of existing asset classes.46 As a result, one method of applying the U.C.C. to lending
arrangements secured by virtual currency collateral may be to establish that
virtual currency is merely derivative of an enumerated asset class—such as
money or investment property—referenced in Article 9. This path however,
shoehorns digital assets into the categories of collateral currently enumerated
in Article 9—an outcome which may be less than ideal.
Second, even if one adds virtual currency to a defined term in order to
capture this new asset class under the U.C.C., the operational mechanics of
perfection and priority may be inconsistent with the nascent technology that
creates digital assets.47 Market participants who are willing to offer loans
secured by digital assets and those seeking to leverage the value of digital
assets have questioned whether lenders may effectively perfect a security
interest in digital assets.48 Finally, a number of questions regarding enforce42. See S.F. 0125, 65th Sess. (Wyo. 2019); Missouri House of Representatives,
H.B. 1159, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2019).
43. See, e.g., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 81207,
2017 WL 7184670, at *1 (July 25, 2017).
44. U.C.C § 9-102 (a)(61).
45. See infra Part II.
46. See, e.g., Timothy Bierer, Note, Hashing It Out: Problems and Solutions Concerning Cryptocurrency Used as Article 9 Collateral, 7 CASE W. RESERVE J.L.
TECH. & INTERNET 79, 88–89 (2016).
47. See Ronald J. Mann, Reliable Perfection of Security Interests in Crypto-Currency, 21 SMU SCI. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
48. See Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing A Framework
for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG.
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ment, cryptography, and liquidity challenge the application of blunt secured
lending regulation in virtual currency markets.
If digital assets are not explicitly included in an existing defined term in
Article 9, secured lenders may find that financing arrangements that list virtual currency as collateral lack the U.C.C.’s well-established enforcement
protections.49 Uncertainty regarding collateral casts a shadow over digital asset transactions that increases transaction costs, reduces efficiencies, and
leaves market participants vulnerable.
Scholars have offered several proposals to address the “perfection problem.” Some advocate for expanding the definitions of certain defined terms
in Article 9 or understanding existing defined terms to include virtual currency.50 According to Jeanne Schroder, classifying virtual currency as uncertificated securities effectively incorporates this new asset class under the
U.C.C.51 Kevin Tu posits that resolving the “perfection problem” requires
amending the U.C.C. to account for this new asset class.52
Others encourage regulators to educate themselves on issues involving
the evolving technology. By examining three examples of firms in the
emerging secured lending market—Unchained Capital, Secured Automated
Lending Technology (SALT) Lending, and Hive—Professor Xuan-Thao
Nguyen introduces an important taxonomy and classifies early lending platforms based on their respective attributes.53 Professor Nguyen cautions, however, that before considering any amendments to the U.C.C., regulators must
understand virtual currency lenders’ innovative use of the technology.54 In
particular, open source multi-signature (multisig) smart contracts have the
potential to overcome the limits created by virtual currencies’ central security
and privacy design features in conventional secured lending arrangements
collateralized by virtual currencies.
Finally, a growing set of proposals suggest that regulation should utilize
the very technology at issue to solve the “perfection problem.” Ronald Mann
and Carla Reyes propose solutions that involve using blockchain technology
to build a decentralized network of records.55 The perfection process may be
enhanced, these scholars contend, by utilizing blockchain technology.56
495 (2015); see also Reyes, supra note 5; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2016); infra Part III.
49.

See infra Part II.

50.

See infra text accompanying note 48.

51.

See infra Part II.

52.

See infra Part II.

53.

See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Lessons from Case Study of Secured Transactions with Bitcoin, 21 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).

54.

Id.

55.

See infra Part II.

56.

See infra Part II.
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Blockchain further offers a more efficient method of creating and storing
records for loans secured by virtual currency and other assets.
While each of these solutions illuminate the challenges underlying the
“perfection problem,” each proposal has noteworthy limitations. Rather than
embrace the attributes of a static regulatory approach, this article argues that
the current structure of the U.C.C. may not adequately address the concerns
raised by this emerging asset class. The innovative use of blockchain to serve
as the recording platform for security interests also faces several difficulties.
The accelerated development of blockchain, and the seismic shifts in the
evolution and application of this technology leave private market participants
struggling to keep pace.
This article contends that regulators and market participants must engage in a collaborative, transparent dialogue and carefully consider the distinguishing features of this nascent class of assets. Part I of this article briefly
explores the ecosystem of virtual currencies. Part II examines the challenges
of defining and using virtual currency as collateral for secured transactions
under the existing contours of Article 9 of the U.C.C. Part III surveys proposed solutions situated within the existing regulatory framework and
beyond.
Part IV compares the approaches adopted by early voices in the market
for digital asset regulation. This Part introduces critical questions regarding
the successes and limitations of various considered and adopted regulatory
paths. Part V offers brief concluding remarks, encouraging regulators to embrace a flexible regulatory approach.
II. A VIRTUAL CURRENCY PRIMER
Virtual currency57 is a medium of exchange.58 Virtual currencies function in a manner similar to long-recognized forms of money, such as government-issued fiat or specie. These forms of money enable market participants
to purchase and sell valuables or engage in a variety of other financial transactions.59 Unlike conventional forms of legal tender or fiat, such as the dollar, euro, or yen, virtual currency is not issued or backed by a sovereign
government.60 Virtual currencies allow transactions on a decentralized, peer57. Note that this analysis of virtual currencies is limited to virtual currencies designed to function as a financial medium of exchange and does not include
other types of utility tokens, altcoins, and other coins that are not intended to
serve as a form of money.
58. Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation
in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 279 (2015).
59. Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin
Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11.
60.

Id.; see Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 503–06 (for a further
description of a virtual currency).
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to-peer platform, thus creating a pathway to transfer value to anyone capable
of receiving the value anywhere in the world.61
By design, virtual currencies and the blockchain, or distributed ledger,
technology underlying these assets enable market participants to create, store,
and transfer the value of the currencies. This in turn reduces the role of conventional payment systems or financial intermediaries, such as banks.62 Like
the sophisticated international banking and payment system ledgers, virtual
currencies solve the double-spend problem—a concern that one might attempt to spend the same asset more than once.63 Blockchain technology
records virtual currency transactions on a decentralized public ledger. While
virtual currencies have not eliminated the need for conventional intermediaries, digital ledger technology enhances market participants’ independence from traditional banking and exchange ledgers and increases
transactional efficiency, thereby lowering transaction costs.
Several design details underscore the nature of virtual currencies and
distinguish this new class of assets from conventional money and payment
systems. Market participants store virtual currency in digital wallets; digital
encryption or cryptography protects the virtual assets and wallets from cyber
criminals or conventional thieves.64 Blockchain is decentralized. This attribute distributes the information recorded in each block on the chain to the

61. Clayton, supra note 59; cf. Hughes, supra note 11, at 7–8 (“Prior to cryptocurrencies, there were three main types of money: commodity money, credit
money, and fiat money. The term commodity money refers to a physical commodity, which was originally valued for its commercial uses. Examples of
commodity money include gold and silver . . . . The second type of money,
credit money, differs fundamentally from commodity money. It consists of
non-interest-bearing receivables that cannot be redeemed on demand. As a rule,
credit money is often issued as a redeemable rate with commodity money or
fiat money . . . . The last type of money is fiat money. Today, all government
issued currencies are fiat. This means that the money itself has no intrinsic
value but obtains value from government decree. The value of the currency is
not based on a link to the value of a commodity but on trust in the government
or central bank that issues the fiat money. Theoretically, the amount of fiat
money can be expanded indefinitely, which has led to hyperinflation in the
several countries throughout history that have experimented with fiat money. In
contrast, cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, usually have a mathematically limited amount of supply, and thus also a limited and precisely determinable supply inflation. Due to the decentralized and digital nature of bitcoin, it does not
easily fit into any of the three traditional types of money.”).
62. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 11.
63. See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoing: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System, BITCOIN.ORG (2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
64. Tu & Meredith, supra note 58, at 279; JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO,
BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 7 (2016).
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entire network of blockchain participants.65 Virtual currency “miners” verify
transactions executed on the blockchain.66
Market participants create virtual currencies through a handful of
processes, the most common of which involve coin offerings or mining.67
Creating virtual currency through a coin offering simply entails issuing coins
and distributing ownership rights in exchange for value, cash, or conventional fiat.68 The mining process is more intricate and resource intensive.69
For each virtual currency transaction that involves mining, information regarding the transaction is broadcast to the network of virtual currency holders, miners, and others who have installed the blockchain protocol on their
computers.70 Miners monitor the blockchain and, through their execution of
mathematical problems, verify the identities of parties engaged in transactions on the blockchain and confirm the authenticity of the transaction.71
65. See Schroeder, supra note 48, at 11; see generally Nakamoto, supra note 63.
66. See Michael Nielson, How the Bitcoin Protocol Actually Works, DATA DRIVEN
INTELLIGENCE BLOG (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.michaelnielsen.org/ddi/howthe-bitcoin-protocol-actually-works/.
67. This article notes that there are a range of relevant protocols that may be implicated, but for simplicity focuses on proof of work. See Andrew Tar, Proof of
Work Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 17, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/
explained/proof-of-work-explained.
68.

See Clayton, supra note 59.

69. Discussion of the mining process is beyond the scope of this article. Like the
gold mining process, cryptocurrency mining uses immense computer power to
find solutions to complex problems. See KEVIN DOWD, NEW PRIVATE MONIES:
A BIT-PART PLAYER? 41 (2014).
70. Nakamoto, supra note 63.
71. Tu & Meredith, supra note 58, at 283. In the Bitcoin context, “the network
adjusts the difficulty of ‘finding’ Bitcoin to the number of active ‘miners’ and
the computer power used in a way that was initially set to generate a production
rate of 50 Bitcoin every ten minutes.” DOWD, supra note 69, at 41; see also Tu
& Meredith, supra note 58, at 284 (footnotes omitted) (“Before a block can be
added to the ‘block chain,’ a miner’s computer is required to correctly solve ‘a
difficult mathematical problem, called a “proof-of-work.’ ” The difficulty of the
algorithm adjusts itself such that, on average, one ‘block’ is created every ten
minutes. This mining process limits the total amount of currency that enters
into the Bitcoin market and renders non-market fluctuations impossible. New
bitcoins only enter the market after the addition of a ‘block’ to the ‘block
chain.’ A block is merely a record of a recent Bitcoin transaction. However, the
creation of ‘blocks’ occurs at a predictable rate. This is ensured by the increasing difficulty of the ‘proof of work’ required before a ‘block’ can be added. As
such, it is known as a mathematical certainty the rate at which new blocks, will
be created.”); Schroeder, supra note 48, at 12 n.35 (“The system depends on
the equilibrium caused by the factors that (i) on the one hand, these algorithms
take a lot of computer power to solve so that only a limited number of miners
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Solving the mathematical problems is not simple and requires increasingly
significant volumes of computing energy. Miners “offer their computing
power in exchange for the chance of winning newly ‘minted’ Bitcoin” and
then record those transactions on the public blockchain.72 Upon discovering
the solution to an outstanding mathematical problem and confirming the authenticity of a transaction, miners receive virtual currency as a reward for
their efforts.73
Verified transactions become links connecting blocks in a chain of
transactions creating a blockchain. The earliest protocols that designed
blockchains presumed these ledgers would be publicly accessible, permissionless databases that stored verified records or transactions on the
blockchain.74 The blockchain protocol is built on a decentralized, distributed
ledger of transactions, meaning the protocol operates across a network of
computers. Consequently, virtual currency exists in a series of records embedded in blocks and stored on every computer within the applicable network.75 This intentionally decentralized design aims to reduce the likelihood
that a single point of vulnerability in the network would render the virtual
currency susceptible to cyber-theft.76

have any chance to claim a bitcoin, and (ii) on the other, solving the algorithms
takes shear computer power rather than skill.”). The cryptocurrency mining
process will not continue indefinitely; the total amount mined cannot exceed 21
million. DOWD, supra note 69, at 41; BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 64, at 9
(“This process of mining bitcoins will not continue forever. Bitcoin was designed to mimic the extraction of gold or other precious metals from the
earth—only a limited, known number of bitcoins can ever be mined. The arbitrary number chosen to be the cap is 21 million bitcoins. Miners are projected
to painstakingly harvest the last ‘satoshi’ (named for the unidentified Satoshi
Nakamoto), or 0.00000001 of a Bitcoin, in the year 2140.”).
72. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 11; see generally Nakamoto, supra note 63.
73. DOWD, supra note 69; see also BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 64, at 7–9.
74. See DOWD, supra note 69, at 41. Permissioned blockchains are blockchain
ledgers that “need special permissions to read, access, and write information on
them” and whose intrinsic configuration “ ‘controls the participants’ transactions and defines their roles in which each participant can access and contribute
to the blockchain.”; see also Permissioned Blockchains, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/p/permissioned-blockchains.asp (last visited
Mar. 8, 2019). Permissioned ledgers differ from both public ledgers and private
ledgers. Unlike permissioned blockchains that require accessers and users to
have special permission, anyone can read, copy, or make changes to public
ledgers, and unlike permissioned ledgers, only known nodes are permitted to
participate in private ledgers. Id.
75. Kristin Johnson, Banking on Blockchain (forthcoming 2019).
76.

Id.
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III. VIRTUAL CURRENCY UNDER THE U.C.C.
Security arrangements enable market participants to avoid the expense
and difficulty of accessing the value of illiquid assets such as real estate,
unregistered securities, or artwork. Consider, for example, a coin collector
with a portfolio of rare coins. The coin collector seeks to enjoy the value of
the coin collection but laments the thought of selling her precious coins, especially because it is unlikely she will be able to repurchase the same coins
in the future.
Rather than sell her collection, the coin collector may solicit a lender
and ask to borrow cash in exchange for entering into an agreement to repay
the borrowed cash at agreed upon intervals. Because the lender’s motives are
not altogether altruistic, the lender may demand that the borrower repay the
principal on the loan and pay interest at either a fixed or variable rate. The
lender may also request that the coin collector agree to forfeit certain specific
coins or all of the coins if the borrower should fail to repay the principal debt
obligation (cash borrowed) or interest on the loan.77 The borrower and the
lender will typically enter into a security agreement that identifies rare coins
as collateral and indicates that ownership of the coins will pass to the lender
or creditor if the coin collector defaults on the loan obligations.78
For debtors and creditors, secured lending arrangements that designate
digital assets as collateral79 engender both opportunities and challenges. This
Part examines the existing regulatory framework applied when a creditor
seeks to perfect a security interest in collateral and the benefits and limitations of this approach in the context of virtual currency collateral.
A. Conventional Forms of Collateral
The U.C.C. governs transactions in which a lender claims a security
interest in a borrower’s collateral.80 Once adopted by state legislatures, the
77. See, e.g., What in the World is a General Intangible?, DAVENPORT EVANS LAW
(Sept. 10, 2013), https://dehs.com/what-in-the-world-is-a-general-intangible/.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Shawn Gordon, Options for Borrowing and Lending with Cryptocurrency Are on the Rise, BITCOIN MAG. (Dec. 4, 2017, 10:02 AM), https://
bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/options-borrowing-and-lending-cryptocurrencyare-rise/; see also Kharif, These Guys Want to Lend You Money, supra note 18;
Frederick Reese, Top 7 Borrowing and Lending Platforms for Bitcoin, BITCOIN
MKT. J. (Dec. 20, 2017, 1:13 PM), https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/
bitcoin-borrowing/.
80. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(12) (“ ‘Collateral’ means the property subject to a security
interest or agricultural lien. The term includes: (A) proceeds to which a security
interest attaches; (B) accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes that have been sold; and (C) goods that are the subject of a consignment.”); see, e.g., Lawless, supra note 24 (“The bank that gave you a car loan
has an Article 9 security interest in the automobile serving as collateral for the
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language of the U.C.C. becomes state law, and is applicable to any financing
arrangements within the ambit of the relevant state statute. The U.C.C operational provisions apply in a rigid and formal manner.
To create an enforceable security interest, a secured lending agreement
must include a description of the collateral that serves as a guarantee that the
debtor will repay outstanding obligations.81 Collateral designated in the financing arrangement may be classified as either tangible or intangible personal property.82 Notwithstanding the broad scope of these two categories of
collateral, neither expressly includes a reference to virtual currency. To apply
the U.C.C. to lending arrangements secured by virtual currency, lenders must
establish that virtual currency fits into a U.C.C. Article 9 category of
collateral.83
Article 9 of the U.C.C. describes tangible property in broad language
and emphasizes the physical attributes of tangible property.84 A lender or her
agent may take physical possession of tangible assets.85 Commonly cited examples of tangible assets include money, agricultural commodities (such as
coffee, wheat, or corn), equipment, inventory, fixtures, and negotiable instruments.86 Examples of intangible assets, on the other hand, include accounts,
software, investment property, letters of credit, letter-of-credit rights, and
“general intangibles.”87 Article 9 describes “general intangibles” as: “any
personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money,
and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction. The term includes payment
intangibles and software.”88 “General intangibles” is thus a catch-all term
loan, and the bank providing operating capital for your corner bakery similarly
may have an Article 9 security interest in the inventory, equipment, and accounts at the store.”).
81. See U.C.C. § 9-203; Louis Del Duca & Patrick Del Duca, Judicial Highlights:
Article 9—Secured Transactions, 40 U.C.C. L.J. 1 Art. 5, §§ 9-108, 9-203
(2007).
82.

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(12); see also Schroeder, supra note 48, at 10 (describing
the various different categories of personal property that can be used as collateral in secured lending transactions under Article 9).

83.

See U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (stating that among other things, Article 9 of the U.C.C.
applies to secured transactions that create “a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract,” regardless of the transaction’s form, and to
“sale[s] of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes”).

84.

Id. § 9-102(a)(44).

85.

Id. § 9-313(a).

86.

See id. § 9-102(a)(44).

87.

See id.

88. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42).
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that captures various forms of personal property except for those types of
personal assets specifically exempted by the language of the definition—excluded assets.89 Based on this construction, market participants, drafters, and
courts often presume that an asset is a general intangible unless the asset
appears on the enumerated list of excluded assets.90
B. Applying the Existing U.C.C. Regulatory Framework to Virtual
Currency
The U.C.C. segregates collateral into two general categories: tangible
assets and intangible assets. Tangible assets typically include physical resources, such as goods, money, inventory, and equipment. Whereas intangible assets include assets such as accounts, investment property, letter-ofcredit rights, and general intangibles. Attempts to fit virtual currency into the
express definitions of tangible and intangible assets under Article 9 reveal the
uniqueness of this new asset class.91
Consider, for example, attempts to classify virtual currency as tangible
“goods.” Article 9 defines “goods” as assets that are “movable when a security interest attaches.”92 Virtual currency is among the most liquid assets in
contemporary financial markets. Virtual assets are stored in digital wallets
and traded on digital platforms.93 Developers design the blockchain protocol
that facilitates virtual currency creation and trading to enable virtual currency
to function in a wholly digital or virtual manner.94
Virtual assets are antithetical to tangible assets or physical resources.
Notwithstanding market participants’ ability to execute transactions moving
virtual currency at exceptional speeds across global markets,95 it would be
inaccurate to suggest that virtual currency is “moveable” in a manner like the

89. Id.
90. See Kevin V. Tu, Perfecting Bitcoin, 52 GA. L. REV. 505, 547–50 (2018).
91.

See id. at 547.

92. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44).
93. Adam J. Levitin, Pandora’s Digital Box: The Promise and Perils of Digital
Wallets, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 315 (2018).
94. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 11.
95. Tu, supra note 90, at 511–12.
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transfer of physical resources.96 Virtual currency is an intangible, digital
record.97
Even if it is not a tangible asset, virtual currency may be considered a
“general intangible.” Some suggest that virtual currency is analogous to
software, an asset class that is defined in Article 9 as “a computer program
and any supporting information provided in connection with a transaction
relating to the program.”98 This argument, however, misunderstands the
structure and design of digital assets.
Although blockchain—the underlying protocol for virtual currency—is
transferred, reconciled, and indeed created by computer code, it is not traditional software.99 Early developers designed the blockchain protocol as
permissionless, open-source code available to anyone who downloads the
protocol. Accessibility is a critical feature of the protocol’s design.100 While
blockchain developers and commentators note a lack of uniform definitions
for basic terminology, all agree that the blockchain protocol and the code that
creates virtual currency are clearly distinguishable from general references to
software.101
Demonstrating that virtual currencies are not “general intangibles” may
simply involve confirming that this new asset class is among the list of excluded assets in the term’s definition. Virtual currencies share notable similarities with several excluded assets, namely “accounts,” “money,” and

96. See Schroeder, supra note 48, at 11, 22 (noting virtual currency “has no physical form” and “is a digital rather than physical form of money”); Tu, supra note
90, at 548 (“Virtual currency is outside the scope of the definition [of goods in
U.C.C. Article 9] because it is not moveable. Unlike tangible personal property,
virtual currency is created and stored electronically. It is digital and has no
physical manifestation.”); see also infra text accompanying note 130 (describing physical possession as a method for perfecting a security interest in tangible
collateral).
97. See Daniel Krawisz, Bitcoin as a Store of Value, Unit of Account, and Medium
of Exchange, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INST. (Jan. 12, 2015), https://nakamotoinstitute.org/mempool/bitcoin-as-a-store-of-value-unit-of-account-and-medium-ofexchange/.
98. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(76) (stating that this definition excludes a computer program
that is included in Article 9’s definition of “goods.”).
99. See, e.g., Ian A. Holcomb, Bitcoin’s Standing Within the Global Regulatory
and Economic Marketplace, 23 CURRENTS: J. INT’L ECON. L. 56, 61 (2016)
(Virtual currencies “are intangible pieces of coding, similar to software . . . . [In
Article 9,] ‘software’ is defined as a specific type of ‘general intangible.’ While
this definition appears to be suitable on its face, it ignores the economic realities of [virtual currencies]. [Virtual currencies are] more than just software. In
fact, [they tend] to act more like a deposit account and investment property.”).
100. See Schroeder, supra note 48, at 10–11.
101. See supra text accompanying note 99.
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“investment property.”102 Notwithstanding these similarities, careful consideration reveals that virtual currencies are functionally distinct from the relevant excluded assets.103
Due to its functional role as a “store of value,” one may suggest that
virtual currency is a type of “account” or perhaps even a “deposit account.”
Article 9 describes “accounts” as rights to payment for services rendered or
goods delivered.104 The U.C.C. defines “deposit accounts” as arrangements
involving a bank acting as custodian.105 Each virtual currency wallet is functionally a type of account,106 as each stores value. The “accounts” referenced
in Article 9, however, are distinguishable from virtual currency wallets.107 In
contrast to “deposit accounts” or “accounts,” digital wallets that contain virtual currency do not necessarily involve financial obligations owed to third
parties.108 A growing number of banks and many other financial intermediaries offer virtual currency wallets or facilitate trading of virtual currency, participating in the virtual currency wallets and trading platform
market.109 But the creation, underwriting, and distribution and trading of virtual currencies do not necessarily require banks’ participation.
“Money” is likely the excluded asset which most closely resembles virtual currency. In 1962, U.C.C. drafters introduced the term “money,” acknowledging the use of cash, specie, notes, and other forms of currency as
collateral.110 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24) defines “money” as “a medium of ex102. Holcomb, supra note 99, at 61 (Virtual currency “users will want to [know]
how [virtual currencies] could be used commercially, specifically as collateral
for obtaining loans. Articles 8 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code will be
the best resource in resolving this issue. This is a tricky situation, for [virtual
currencies] share similar aspects with several different types of collateral. [Virtual currencies] can be used to purchase property and services, like money;
they are intangible pieces of coding, similar to software; they are stored in a
wallet, like how money is stored in a deposit account, and bitcoins can also be
held for investment, exactly like investment property.”).
103. See Holcomb, supra note 99, at 61–62; see also Tu, supra note 90, at 548–50.
104. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(29).
105. Id.
106. See Holcomb, supra note 99, at 61.
107. Tu, supra note 90, at 549.
108. Tu, supra note 90, at 549.
109. See Holcomb, supra note 99, at 62 (citation omitted) (“ ‘[D]eposit account,’
cannot be the definition [for virtual currencies] for one small reason—the definition of ‘deposit account’ has limiting language to the effect that deposit accounts are ‘maintained with a bank.’ From what we have learned about [virtual
currency] thus far, that is simply not the case. Many [virtual currency] wallets
are either held by the individuals themselves or they are maintained by a third
party exchange, neither of which constitute a bank.”).
110. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 17.
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change currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government.”111 While “money” is not limited to legal tender,112 it does not
encompass every instrument that has value or stores value.
Several of the most well-known and frequently traded virtual currencies
function as a medium of exchange. Like government-issued fiat or specie,
virtual currencies can be exchanged for services, property, or investments.113
In support of claims that virtual currency constitutes a form of “money,” one
may contend that market participants commonly refer to virtual currency as
“coins,” “tokens,” and “currency”; each a commonly adopted moniker for
money.114 Indeed, several state and federal financial market regulators have
adopted policies that subject virtual currency transactions to the regulation
and taxation schemes applied to cash transactions.115 Although a few governments around the world have signaled a desire to issue a form of virtual
currency,116 to date, only a handful of countries have formally issued a type
111. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24).
112. Id. cmt. 24 (“The narrow view that money is limited to legal tender is
repeated.”).
113. Holcomb, supra note 99, at 61.
114. See Schroeder, supra note 48, at 14.
115. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 14 (“Because its proponents refer to bitcoin as a
form of digital currency, and because it is correctly treated as equivalent to
money under the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, it is tempting
to try to argue that one should be able to find a way to fit it into the U.C.C.’s
defined word ‘money.’ ”). The detailed requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act
are outside the scope of this Article.
116. See, e.g., Ralph Atkins & Laura Noonan, Central Banks Should Embrace Digital Currencies, Axel Weber Says, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.ft
.com/content/5019fc52-c845-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e (“In China, the central
bank has said it will develop a digital currency using the blockchain technology
behind bitcoin. In Europe, Sweden’s Riksbank published a report in September
suggesting there were few obstacles to issuing e-krona. But other central banks
have been much more cautious . . . . [For example,] the Swiss National Bank is
not convinced of the need for central bank e-currencies.”); see also Gertrude
Chavez-Dreyfuss, Marshall Islands to Issue Own Sovereign Cryptocurrency,
REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2018, 12:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscrypto-currencies-marshall-islands/marshall-islands-to-issue-own-sovereigncryptocurrency-idUSKCN1GC2UD (“The Marshall Islands will issue its own
cryptocurrency that will be circulated as legal tender along with the U.S. dollar,
according to one of the remote Pacific republic’s top officials. The new currency will be called SOV and its legal tender status has been approved by the
country’s parliament[.] . . . Plans for possible sovereign cryptocurrencies have
gained momentum in recent months, as digital tokens launched by private companies have jumped in value. Several governments, including China, Estonia,
and Iran, have discussed plans for their own digital currency. Venezuela, meanwhile, has gone ahead with a new digital token called the petro, backed by
oil.”); see also Hilary Hosia & Nick Perry, This is the First Country to Adopt a

2018]

(Im)Perfect Regulation

135

of virtual currency and these offerings raise as many questions as they resolve.117 Virtual currencies are not generally issued, authorized, or adopted
by governments.118
The design attributes of virtual currencies further undermine arguments
that these assets fit within the U.C.C.’s definition of money. Early digital
asset architects embraced the blockchain protocol that facilitates the creation
of virtual currency as a response to the financial crisis, which began in 2007
with the introduction of the alternative financial market system.119 Self-described “cryptoenthusiasts” announced their goals to displace governmentissued fiat with an alternative form of money.120

Cryptocurrency as Its Official Currency, TIME (Mar. 5, 2018), http://time.com/
money/5186316/this-is-the-first-country-to-adopt-a-cryptocurrency-as-its-official-currency/ (“The tiny Marshall Islands is creating its own digital currency
in order to raise some hard cash to pay bills and boost the economy. The Pacific island nation said it became the first country in the world to recognize a
cryptocurrency as its legal tender when it passed a law this past week to create
the digital ‘Sovereign,’ or SOV. In the nation of 60,000, the cryptocurrency
will have equal status with the U.S. dollar as a form of payment. Venezuela last
month became the first country to launch its own cryptocurrency when it
launched the virtual Petro, backed by crude oil reserves. The Marshall Islands
said the SOV will be different because it will be recognized in law as legal
tender, effectively backed by the government.”).
117. See, e.g., Eric Lam, What the World’s Central Banks Are Saying About Bitcoin,
BLOOMBERG TECH. (Dec. 14, 2017, 8:53 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-12-15/what-the-world-s-central-banks-are-saying-aboutcryptocurrencies (last updated Apr. 4, 2018) (describing briefly the world’s
largest central banks’ views on cryptocurrencies).
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 11, at 3–4 (citation omitted) (“After 20 years of
failed attempts at making a private virtual currency, Bitcoin emerged somewhat
inexplicably out of the 2007/08 global banking crisis. The creator(s) of Bitcoin,
who is still unknown, was determined to provide a decentralized, private, and
secure means of transferring value online without interference by sovereign
entities, central banks, or financial intermediaries or any other ‘trusted third
party.’ ”); Jordan Eliseo, Bitcoin, Dollars, Gold: What Is the Future of Money?,
ABC BULLION (Nov. 2017), at 4, https://www.abcbullion.com.au/media/pdf/
Bitcoin-Dollars-and-Gold-ABC-Bullion.pdf (stating one “motivation behind
the creation of [bitcoin (BTC)] was a likely frustration with the monetary (as
well as economic and political) status quo, with the world still in the grip of the
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) back in early 2009 when BTC was first
released.”).
120. See Stephanie Lo & J. Christina Wang, Currency Policy Perspectives: Bitcoin
as Money?, 14-4 FED. RES. BANK BOS. 1, 2 (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/cpp1404.pdf (“The ultimate goal of Bitcoin, according to its advocates, is to serve as an alternative to
the existing payments system and to enable transactions across national borders
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As a result, commentators generally assume that virtual currency is not
an asset that satisfies the elements described in the U.C.C.’s definition of
“money.”121 Jeanne Schroeder notes that in context, this definition is clearly
“intended to cover only hand-to-hand money” (i.e., physical cash) because it
explicitly excludes intangible deposit accounts.122 “Even though virtual currency is stored in a physical form of sorts, because access is facilitated by
tangible goods such as a computer or a smartphone,”123 virtual currency is
not a tangible good and not money as defined by the U.C.C.124 Thus, virtual
currencies do not fit into the U.C.C. definition of “money.”
One can imagine that virtual currency may constitute “investment property.” Article 9 defines “investment property” as certificated and uncertificated securities, security entitlements, securities accounts, commodity
contracts, and commodity accounts.125 Further below, we discuss a recent
report by the SEC exploring the application of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Act of 1934 to virtual currencies. Assuming that at least some
virtual currencies do not qualify as “securities,” adopting this blanket approach seems over-inclusive.126 While virtual currency may share attributes
with commonly referenced classes of securities, such as shares of stocks and
bonds, there are coins and tokens that lack important features of financial
arrangements that constitute investment property.127
Absent new case law or amendments or additions to the U.C.C., virtual
currencies would likely be classified as general intangibles, as they do not fit
and currency denominations without the interference of sovereign entities or
central banks, and without the alleged exploitation by traditional financial intermediaries such as banks. From the viewpoint of supporters of virtual currencies, national governments often impose undesirable controls, such as
restrictions on convertibility, while central banks may facilitate an oversupply
of currency, leading to hyperinflation. At the same time, many groups bemoan
the exorbitant fees, among other alleged abuses imposed by banks.”).
121. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24); Michael R. Gordon et al., Bitcoin116 to
Blockchain: How Laws and Regulations Are Conforming to and Impacting the
Use of Virtual Currency, 20160428P N.Y. CTY. BAR 1, 40 (2016) (citations
omitted) (“[W]hether or not a Bitcoin [or other cryptocurrency] is ‘money’ for
other purposes, a Bitcoin does not appear to be ‘money’ under the U.C.C. . . . .
Bitcoins are not authorized or adopted by governments. Perhaps a secured creditor could authorize Bitcoin dispositions for ordinary course operations, but it is
unclear how a transferee would confirm that all liens that previously attached to
the relevant Bitcoins have been released.”).
122. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 17–18.
123. Tu, supra note 90, at 548.
124. See Tu, supra note 90, at 547–48.
125. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49).
126. See Tu, supra note 90, at 549–50.
127. See Tu, supra note 90, at 550.
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within any of Article 9’s enumerated asset categories. As such, these virtual
currencies would be subject to the rules applicable to general intangibles with
regard to attachment, perfection, priority, and enforcement of security interests in virtual currency assets.
C. The Perfection Problem
Enforceability is a central concern for counterparties that enter into secured lending arrangements, particularly arrangements that lend against virtual currency as collateral. Attachment is required to create an enforceable
security interest. To attach an enforceable security interest: (1) a secured
creditor must give value; (2) a debtor must have rights to the collateral or the
power to give those rights to a creditor; and (3) one of several enumerated
conditions in U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3) must be satisfied.128 The conditions in the
final element of this standard may be satisfied if a debtor authenticates a
security agreement, which must contain a sufficient description of the collateral.129 The creditor may also satisfy the third element of attachment by: (1)
taking possession of collateral that constitutes goods, instruments, money,
negotiable documents, or tangible chattel paper;130 (2) taking control over
collateral that constitutes deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights;131 or (3) taking delivery of collateral
that constitutes certificated securities.132
Attachment creates an enforceable security interest, but creditors must
perfect their security interest in collateral to establish the priority of their
claim on the collateral in the event of a debtor’s default.133 Perfection—a
U.C.C. term of art—refers to the process that puts the world on notice of the
individual’s security interest in specific collateral.134 Perfection is important;
the first creditor to properly attach and perfect a security interest has priority
over everyone else.135
The process of perfecting a security interest in collateral under Article 9
differs based on the kind of collateral guaranteeing repayment in the security
agreement.136 For tangible collateral such as negotiable documents, goods,
instruments, money, and tangible chattel paper, physical possession of the

128. U.C.C. § 9-203(b).
129. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A).
130. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(B).
131. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(D).
132. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(C).
133. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 10.
134. See Schroeder, supra note 48, at 35.
135. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a).
136. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 10.
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collateral is an effective method of perfecting a security interest.137 For deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, and letter-ofcredit rights, obtaining control of the collateral is an effective method of
perfecting a security interest.138 For certificated securities, perfection can be
achieved by taking delivery of the certificated security, meaning the purchaser or person acting on behalf of the purchaser acquires possession of the
security certificate.139 Thus, for these specific types of collateral, possession,
control, and delivery can serve as to both attach and perfect a security interest in those types of collateral.
The default and most common method of perfecting a security interest
under Article 9 for other types of collateral is by filing a UCC-1 financing
statement with the appropriate state office.140 The financing statement need
only contain the creditor’s name, the debtor’s name, and a brief description
of the collateral.141 Thus, one must file a UCC-1 financing statement with a
sufficient description of the collateral (e.g., debtor’s virtual currency assets)
to perfect a security interest in general intangibles.142 The collateral should be
adequately described in the financing statement, though the description can
be as vague as “all assets.”143
Upon perfection, a security interest remains attached to and perfected in
the identified collateral. If a secured creditor successfully attaches and perfects a security interest in collateral, the attachment and perfection apply to
any disposition of the collateral, including proceeds from the sale of the collateral.144 Under U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1), a security interest in collateral continues notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition unless
the secured party authorizes the disposition free of the security interest.145
Apart from selling, licensing, or otherwise disposing of the collateral, a security interest in general intangibles continues unless the secured party con137. U.C.C. § 9-313(a).
138. Id.; George K. Fogg, The U.C.C. and Bitcoins—Solution to Existing Fatal
Flaw, 104 BBR 741, 742 (Apr. 14, 2015).
139. U.C.C. §§ 9-313(e), 8-301(a).
140. Id. § 9-310(a) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . a financing statement must
be filed to perfect all security interests and agricultural liens”); see id. § 9501(a).
141. Id. § 9-502(a).
142. See id. § 9-310(a)–(b); see also Tu, supra note 90, at 552 (“As applied to virtual currency, there is only one viable method of perfection: the filing of a
financing statement that appropriately describes the collateral. Because virtual
currency constitutes a general intangible, the special rules allowing for perfection by possession or control are inapplicable.”).
143. U.C.C. § 9-504.
144. Id. §§ 9-308(c), 9-315(a)–(c).
145. Id. § 9-315(a).
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sents to the transfer free of its security interest, the obligations secured by the
security interest have been satisfied, or the security interest has otherwise
terminated.146
Several challenges arise in the context of perfecting an attached, enforceable security interest in virtual currency. As discussed, virtual currencies are intangible digital assets with no physical attributes.147 Consequently,
perfecting a security interest in virtual currency collateral by possession or
control may not be possible. One could argue that it is possible to take possession or control of the digital wallet that contains the virtual currency. But
this argument is tenuous; custody of virtual currencies rests in control of the
private/public cryptographic key.148 The security measures developed to protect digital wallets require one party to control access to the assets. A virtual
currency holder accesses her digital wallet by employing a private key and a
public key.149 These keys limit access to the virtual currency holder.
The economic realities of virtual currencies and the operational limits of
the U.C.C. have prompted many scholars and commentators to conclude that
virtual currencies are general intangibles.150 If we assume that virtual currencies are general intangibles, perfection of virtual currency collateral could
only be accomplished by filing an effective UCC-1 financing statement.
Even if one concludes that virtual currency is a general intangible, the
mechanics of digital wallets and the public/private encryption keys that protect virtual currencies challenge secured lenders’ ability to employ conventional attachment and perfection processes to maintain a security interest in
this asset class.
In the context of virtual currencies, the operational provisions governing
the ongoing security interest challenge the limits of the formalism of the
U.C.C. If virtual currency is a general intangible and perfection is accomplished by filling a UCC-1 financing statement, a continuing security interest
should exist. If a debtor transfers the virtual currency from one wallet to
another, however, what remedy exists for the secured creditor who has a
valid, perfected security interest in the virtual currency in the wallet? Due to
the operational mechanics of the blockchain on which the transaction occurred, the transfer would be irreversible and facilitated by the anonymous
body of participants on the blockchain.151
146. See id.; Schroeder, supra note 48, at 10.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 95–97.
148. Tu, supra note 90, at 565–66.
149. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 13.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 121–24.
151. Gordon et al., supra note 121, 40–41 (“First, even if a secured creditor has a
valid, perfected security interest in Bitcoins, a separate concern is whether the
secured creditor would have an effective remedy to realize upon its collateral
after a default. Users typically hold Bitcoins in a digital ‘wallet’ and while
Bitcoin transactions are recorded on a decentralized public ledger (the
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As a critical commentator notes the operational mechanics of storing
and transferring virtual currency facilitate asset transfers that make it difficult, if not impossible, for the lender to identify or locate the assets.152 Thus,
even when a borrower grants a lender a first-priority perfected security interest in the virtual currency, the lender may face several difficulties in using
the public key that is an immutable design factor of blockchain technology to
identify purchasers or transferees. Even if a lender can identify the purchasers or transferees of assets, the global nature of the virtual currency market
may make it difficult for lenders to enforce a first-priority perfected security
interest.153
Does a person or entity who accepts virtual currency that has been
pledged as collateral in a secured lending arrangement take that currency free
of the lender’s security interest in that currency?154 These are some of the
many issues and challenges raised with attempting to use the current regulatory framework under U.C.C. Article 9 to the ever-evolving new asset class
of virtual currency collateral.
IV. THE PATH TO MORE PERFECT REGULATION
Commentators have outlined several potential alternative approaches for
integrating virtual currencies into the existing secured transaction framework.155 Some scholars propose amending the existing defined terms or operating provisions of the U.C.C. to expand the scope of the framework and

‘blockchain’), the users are anonymous and Bitcoin transactions are irreversible. Thus, a secured creditor would have difficulty learning that Bitcoin collateral had been transferred or identifying the transferee. Consequently, upon a
default, the secured creditor would have no rapid mechanism to prevent the
debtor from transferring Bitcoins (unlike when a secured creditor has a control
agreement with a bank and can sweep an account). Second, there is a question
as to whether Bitcoins can be described with sufficient specificity to create and
perfect a security interest. For example, although each Bitcoin is unique,
Bitcoin exchanges might place all Bitcoins into a single pot and Bitcoin wallets
present an anonymity issue . . . . Due to challenges in obtaining a perfected
security interest and price volatility, a lender may prefer covenants and representations and warranties precluding Bitcoin ownership or utilization by the
applicable borrower.”).
152. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 11).
153. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 11–12) (“even if the
lender can identify the purchaser, location in a remote jurisdiction might make
enforcement impractical—either because the jurisdiction declines to recognize
the priority of the lender’s interest or because of the increased costs of litigation in a forum remote from the lender’s expectations.”).
154. See Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 11–12) (citations
omitted).
155. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 10.
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encompass these innovative technologies.156 Others posit that re-envisioning
the regulatory system or more substantive changes are required to accommodate this nascent class of assets.157
A. Expanding Existing Definitions
Part II examined whether virtual currency might be understood as an
existing category of collateral: an enumerated tangible or intangible asset or a
general intangible that does not fall within one of the enumerated excluded
assets. The discussion revealed many similarities between virtual currencies
and existing asset classes.158 According to several commentators, expanding
the definition of certain excluded assets in the definition of general intangibles creates a pathway to bring this virtual currency within the existing
regulatory framework.
Some commentators argue excluded assets offer a useful point of departure for incorporating virtual currencies into the existing regulatory framework.159 Many financial products and platforms commonly associated with
investing appear among the list of excluded assets.160 For example, some
scholars have suggested that by expanding the definitions of “deposit accounts,” “money,” and “investment property,” virtual currencies may be
brought into the regulatory fold.
Article 9 defines deposit accounts as custodial arrangements maintained
by a bank.161 Expanding the definition of deposit accounts to expressly include virtual currency wallets superficially addresses the challenge of incorporating this new class of assets into the regulatory framework. This
approach, however, prompts significant questions.
Financial intermediaries may offer virtual currency wallets, serve as virtual currency custodians, or manage platforms for virtual currency exchange.
These intermediaries may create, issue, or facilitate the trading of virtual currencies. To date, however, not all virtual currency intermediaries are regulated financial institutions. Banking entities that provide custodial services
are heavily regulated and highly transparent. To limit these obligations and to
provide an obscuring shroud for virtual currency transactions, many nonbanking financial intermediaries offer digital wallets or operate virtual currency platforms.

156. Id. at 43–46.
157. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 58, at 276–77; Mann, Reliable Perfection,
supra note 47 (manuscript at 4–7). Compare Schroeder, supra note 48, at
276–77, with Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 499.
158. Tu, supra note 90, at 517.
159. Id. at 514.
160. See supra Part II.
161. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(29).
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Expanding the existing definition of “deposit accounts” to include virtual wallets and platforms presumably subjects this new asset class to the
existing regulatory design applied to the intermediaries who operate in these
more highly-regulated areas of financial markets. Adopting a framework that
is slightly less rigorous, such as the regulatory approach applied to securities,
commodities, or derivative exchanges, has similarly significant consequences. Some market participants argue that such a regulatory approach will
stymie the development of emerging virtual currency markets.162
Article 1 defines “money” as a “medium of exchange currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government.”163 According to Bob
Lawless and Lynn LoPucki, a domestic or foreign government’s decision to
adopt virtual currency would integrate this new asset class into the definition
of “money,” bringing virtual currency within the ambit of Article 9.164 This
approach has several limitations.
First, the conclusion that virtual currency is “money” may offer a forward-looking solution, but a significant number of existing wallets are impacted by liens.165 Second, even if a government authorized or adopted
virtual currency, other challenges may persist. As one scholar explained, the
U.C.C. definition of money does not encompass all forms of currency.166
Instead, it is limited to tangible fiat used in hand-to-hand transactions.167 Finally, as noted in Part III, the established operational approach for perfecting
a security interest in money—possession—is not achievable with virtual currency.168 Based on its intentional digital design, physical possession of the
code that represents virtual currency ranges from difficult (if the virtual currency is stored in cold wallets) to nearly impossible (if the virtual currency is
stored in hot wallets).169
162. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 499–500.
163. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24).
164. Lawless, supra note 24.
165. Id.
166. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 20–22 (“The U.C.C.’s idiosyncratic limitation of
money to hand-to-hand currency can be seen by the fact that it does not include
in the definition the most common form in which money is held within this
country—that is, deposit accounts . . . . Probably the most obvious (albeit, once
again, indirect) indication that the defined term ‘money’ as used in the U.C.C.
is intended to cover only hand-to-hand money is the fact that Article 9 distinguishes ‘money’ from ‘deposit accounts.’ ”).
167. Id. at 20.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 23–24 (“The U.C.C. uses the word ‘possession’ over 100 times. In
only two or three places is this modified by the word ‘physical.’ Reading the
U.C.C. as a whole, and understanding the customs and practices it enshrines,
the term ‘possession’ is meant as physical custody of a tangible thing.”).
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Given the similarities between virtual currencies and investment properties, some suggested the definition of “investment property” could be expanded to include virtual currencies as collateral.170 Article 9 defines
investment property as “a security, whether certificated or uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, commodity contract, or commodity
account.”171
Jeanne Schroeder argues that understanding virtual currencies as “uncertificated securities” (a type of investment property) governed by Article 8
may overcome a number of the challenges with making virtual currencies
“deposit accounts” or “money” under Article 9.172 According to Professor
Schroeder, digital wallets and exchange platforms facilitate investment securities transactions which makes the virtual currency stored in wallets and
traded on platforms “financial assets.”173 Article 8 of the U.C.C. regulates
transactions involving such financial assets or “uncertificated securities.”174

170. See, e.g., Fogg, supra note 138, at 4 (arguing that “changing the Article 9
collateral type of bitcoins from general intangibles to investment property” will
eliminate the flaws in Article 9 as it relates to virtual currency).
171. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49).
172. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 69 (stating that U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(18) “defines an
uncertificated security as ‘a security that is not represented by a certificate’ ”
and U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(15) defines a “security” as “an obligation of an issuer or
a share, participation, or other interest in an issuer, or a share, participation, or
other interest in an issue or in property or an enterprise of an issuer: (i) which is
represented by a security in bearer or registered form, or the transfer of which
may be registered upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of
the issuer; (ii) which is one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a
class or series of shares, participations, interests, or obligations; and (iii) which:
(A) is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or securities
markets: or (B) is a medium for investment and by its terms expressly provides
that it is a security governed by this Article.”); Schroeder, supra note 48, at 69
(A classic example of a security is “common stock—the residual equity interest
in a corporation.”); Schroeder, supra note 48, at 69–70 (Thus, if common stock
were issued on a blockchain, it would be an uncertificated security.); Schroeder, supra note 48, at 2 (maintaining that Article 8 could also “provide a legal
regime for another contemplated use for the blockchain—namely as a readily
searchable means of recording the ownership and transfer of property generally.”); see generally Reyes, supra note 5 (discussing the advantages and potential uses for blockchain or distributed ledger technology); Schroeder, supra
note 48, at 72. Additionally, Schroeder notes that unlike the U.C.C.’s use of the
term “possession” with regards to money, the U.C.C. uses the term “delivery”
with regard to securities, which means that transfer of uncertificated securities
“is not implicitly limited to a transfer of physical custody, but is a term of art
for the act(s) that is necessary to complete the transfer of the security.” Id.
173. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 46, 59–60.
174. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 59.
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Re-envisioning Article 8 overcomes many concerns regarding the application of the U.C.C. to virtual currency. Under to this approach, virtual currencies may be understood as “financial assets” because this new asset class
represents “interest . . . in property . . . which is, or is of a type, dealt in or
traded on financial markets, or which is recognized in any area in which it is
issued or dealt in as a medium for investment.”175 While this approach may
eliminate difficulties that arise when satisfying the demanding and detailed
path toward perfection, recognizing virtual currency as uncertificated securities engenders a new set of problems.
Article 8 defines “financial assets” as “assets held by a ‘securities intermediary’ that maintains ‘securities accounts’ for others (‘accountholders’) in
the ordinary course of business, provided the intermediary agrees to treat the
assets as financial assets under Article 8.”176 Adopting this approach, virtual
currencies would be “financial assets” and a virtual currency wallet would be
comparable to a “securities account,” which the U.C.C. defines as “an account to which a financial asset is or may be credited in accordance with an
agreement under which the person maintaining the account undertakes to
treat the person for whom the account is maintained as entitled to exercise
the rights that comprise the financial asset.”177
Some might also attempt to argue that the financial intermediaries that
facilitate the transactions should be regulated as “brokers.”178 If securities
market regulators concluded that all virtual currencies are securities, then
navigating the quagmire of securities regulations may offer a logical approach. Without such a conclusion, this approach introduces significant hurdles and it may create more questions than it resolves. As discussed above,
virtual currencies are diverse, and each coin, alt-coin, or token varies significantly from others.
Some virtual currencies offer the promise of appreciation or an investment return.179 Others function quite differently.180 There is no single, uni175. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9)(ii); see also Fogg, supra note 138, at 3–4 (describing
the various benefits of having a U.C.C. Article 8 structure for
cryptocurrencies).
176. U.C.C. §§ 8-102(a)(14), 8-501(a).
177. Id. § 8-501(a); Holcomb, supra note 99, at 62.
178. See Clayton, supra note 59.
179. See Alex Lielacher, Top 5 Biggest ICOs (by Return on Investment), BITCOIN
MKT. J. (Aug. 6, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/biggest-icos-roi/ (providing that Bitcoin and Ethereum are two virtual currencies
that have shown promise of appreciation and return on investment, and describing Ethereum as one of the top five best-performing initial coin offering tokens
in terms of return on investment); Jemima Kelly, $10,000 in Sight For Bitcoin
As It Rockets to New Record High, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2017, 2:51 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-global-markets-bitcoin/10000-in-sight-for-bitcoinas-it-rockets-to-new-record-high-idUSKBN1DR0VP (noting that both Bitcoin
and Ethereum have seen “stratospheric gains” in the last few years); Rituparna
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form class of virtual currency. Each virtual currency has unique properties.
Each currency must be evaluated on its merits and based on its function and
utility. Consequently, there is no single classification for all virtual currencies and no basis for concluding that the entire universe of virtual currencies
might be described as “investment property.”181 More importantly, treating
virtual currency as uncertificated securities threatens one of the most prized
attributes of virtual currency: market participants’ ability to transfer funds
directly between persons without any third-party intermediary.182

Ghosh et al., Bitcoin or Ethereum? The Million Dollar Question, THE ECONOMIST (2016), https://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/carey_business_
school_submission.pdf (using a risk assessment model to conclude that a portfolio consisting of equal parts Ether and Bitcoin would result in “an expected
return of 115.5 percent over the next 5 years” when “[t]aking into consideration
cryptocurrency environment and potential of both cryptocurrencies”).
180. See, e.g., Arics Technology, Introduction to Cryptocurrency — Different Types
of Cryptocurrency, MEDIUM (Jan. 1, 2018), https://medium.com/@aricstechno
logy7/introduction-to-cryptocurrency-different-types-of-cryptocurrency-6297
33514de6 (describing several types of virtual currencies and their primary uses
including Ripple, which “allows organizations such as banks and companies to
securely and instantly send money at almost no cost”; Litecoin, which “focuses
on using the latest in technology to improve performance and user experience”;
and NEO, which allows “developers to build their own cryptocurrency”); Different Types of Cryptocurrency, EMPIRICA, http://empirica.io/blog/differenttypes-cryptocurrency/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019); see also supra text accompanying note 108.
181. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49)(defining “investment property” as “a security,
whether certificated or uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account,
commodity contract, or commodity account.”); see also William Hinman, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic), (June 14, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418 (discussing the difficulties in determining whether virtual currencies can be classified as securities,
and stating that while ICOs are considered securities, “the Ethereum network
and its decentralized structure, current offers and sales of Ether are not securities transactions.”).
182. See Schroeder, supra note 48, at 18 (suggesting that for cryptocurrencies to
“really to take off as a payment system, let alone a currency, it may be necessary to amend the U.C.C. to add a super-negotiability rule for cryptocurrency.”); see also Bierer, supra note 46, at 88–89 (proposing how U.C.C.
“Article 9 could be amended or clarified in order to provide a clearer legal
basis for [using cryptocurrency as collateral],” including proposals to treat
cryptocurrency as traditional currency under Article 9, classify cryptocurrency
as an investment property under Article 9, or classify cryptocurrency as a security under Article 8 or the Securities Act of 1933).
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Another popular proposal suggests recognizing virtual currency as a
payment system.183 “Over the past few years, Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Dash
have begun to compete with PayPal, Western Union, and bank wires as a
global payment system.”184 For instance, the Bitcoin network permits users to
send virtual currency anywhere in the world for approximately forty cents
per transaction.185 Virtual currency users conduct approximately 360,000
transactions per day on the Bitcoin network.186 U.C.C. Article 4A describes a
regulatory framework for payment systems that facilitate transactions between intermediaries (banks) and their customers.187 According to recent proposals, the U.C.C. drafters should expand Article 4A to provide a similar
regulatory framework for transactions involving virtual currencies.188
Article 4A provides the basis for state laws that regulate fund transfers
“in which commercial banks act for the originator and beneficiary and also
serve as intermediaries in the series of transfers needed to push funds into the
beneficiary’s account.”189 Article 4A sets forth specific requirements for issuing and accepting payment orders, including: when and how acceptance can
occur; how one can reject, cancel, or amend a payment order; how to handle
erroneous or unauthorized payment orders; when certain payment orders are
unenforceable; and what information can be relied on in processing payment
orders.190
Scholars Sarah Hughes and Stephen Middlebrook propose that a comprehensive framework for regulating virtual currency as a payment system
could be modeled off of, or added as a subpart to, U.C.C. Article 4A.191 This
is because Article 4A “offers the closest analogy to rules for multi-party
183. See U.C.C. § 4A-104(a); Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 549–59;
Stephen M. McJohn & Ian McJohn, The Commercial Law of Bitcoin and
Blockchain Transactions, U.C.C. L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2016); see RONALD J.
MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS: THE ESSENTIALS (2013) (providing a general background on payment systems); see also Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet
Payment Intermediaries, 82 TEX. L. REV. 681 (2004).
184. See Hughes, supra note 11, at 5; see also Gur Huberman et al., The Economics
of the Bitcoin Payment System, VOXEU (Dec. 16, 2017), https://voxeu.org/article/economics-bitcoin-payment-system (“The blockchain design enables
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to function similarly to conventional electronic payment systems such as PayPal, Venmo, FedWire, Swift, and Visa . . . .
The innovation in Bitcoin’s blockchain design is its ability to operate an electronic payment system without a governing organization.”).
185. Hughes, supra note 11, at 5.
186. Hughes, supra note 11, at 5.
187. McJohn & McJohn, supra note 183, at 16–18.
188. McJohn & McJohn, supra note 183, at 16–18.
189. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 550.
190. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 4A-201–4A-212.
191. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 558–59.
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transfers of credits in the United States.”192 They state that such a framework
should address the diversity of issues that arise in virtual currency transactions.193 Specifically, Hughes and Middlebrook contend that such regulations
should require transparency with: security procedures; subrogation rights requirements for how virtual currency intermediaries execute payment instructions and how to treat cancellations or amendments to those instructions;
duties of virtual currency intermediaries; provisions for how to handle lost
virtual currencies, erroneous, counterfeit, or unauthorized information or instructions; and how to deduct any applicable fees.194 Hughes and Middlebrook argue that although much of Article 4A’s current terminology could
be applied to virtual currency payments laws, there is a risk of confusion for
using the same terms for cash and credit payment systems as for virtual currency payment systems.195 Thus, U.C.C. drafters should use new language for
terms related to virtual currency payment systems.196 For purposes of their
article, Hughes and Middlebrook suggest using the term “initiator” for the
person issuing instructions for payment of goods or services to a virtual currency wallet, exchange, or other intermediary or converting virtual currency
to fiat; the term “recipient” for the person receiving payment for goods or
services; and the terms “wallet operator” and “exchange operator” for people
or entities who operate public virtual currency wallets or virtual currency
exchanges.197
Hughes and Middlebrook also posit that regulation of virtual payment
systems based on Article 4A should address virtual currency payments
(transaction-execution rules) as well as key behavioral norms.198 It should
also address definitions for market participants (e.g., exchange operator and
wallet operator) and their responsibilities, including instructions for market
participants as well as virtual currency payment instructions, apportioning
risks, any potential fees and fee disclosure requirements, and risk calculation,
and limitations on liability.199 They further suggest that “[l]ike section 4A192. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 558–59.
193. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 550 (providing that such issues include: “defining the framework’s subject matter and covered participants, giving cryptocurrency payment instructions to their respective intermediaries,
executing senders’ cryptocurrency payments instructions, fixing the Timing
and Effect of Payments; Obligations to the Initiator of the Payment Instruction;
Obligations of Intermediaries to Complete Transaction; Discharge of Underlying Obligations, and, addressing miscellaneous Issues that include provisions
related to creditor service of process.”).
194. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 552–54.
195. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 551.
196. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 551.
197. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 551.
198. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 554–55.
199. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 551–54.
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406(d), the rules for [virtual currency] intermediaries should provide that no
agreement except one made by the initiator and recipient of the crypto-payment should affect the rights and obligations to the [virtual currency] payment instruction.”200 Hughes and Middlebrook state that such rules could
address other issues such as how to handle when “creditor process is served
on the recipient’s agent” and notices of receipt to initiators and recipients of
virtual currency payments.201
Simply amending defined terms may be insufficient, however, to address the comprehensive challenges raised by transactions secured by virtual
currency.202 Moreover, amendments to the U.C.C. require review, debate,
recommendation, and a formal resolution by the U.C.C. drafters. Consequently, such an approach would be subject to anticipatable delays and the
influence of interested parties.203 Amending certain operating provisions of
the U.C.C. may offer a more effective approach to integrating virtual currency into the secured transactions regulatory framework.
B. Integrating A New Class of Collateral
Rather than adding “virtual currency” to the definition of existing defined terms in U.C.C. Article 9, Kevin Tu proposes that drafters make virtual
currency its own distinct type of collateral and revise the U.C.C. to supplement the framework for this new class.204 Tu contends that “Article 9 can
only develop and implement rules specific to virtual currency collateral if it
exists separately from other types of general intangibles.”205 The best way to
200. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 554 (citing U.C.C. § 4A-406(d)).
201. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 48, at 556.
202. U.C.C. § 9-322(a); Schroeder, supra note 48, at 15–16 (stating that U.C.C. § 9332(a) provides, with respect to money, that: “A transferee of money takes the
money free of a security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion with the
debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.” § 9-322(a). Virtual currencies could only truly function as money under the U.C.C. if they are governed
by a rule like § 9-332(a) because one of the trademarks of money is that if you
take cash dollars as payment, “you can always be sure that no previous claimant could try to replevy it from you.”).
203. See Pamela J. Martinson & Christopher P. Masterson, Bitcoin and the Secured
Lender, 33 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 13, 19 (2014).
204. See Tu, supra note 90, at 561 (stating “it may not be appropriate to relegate
virtual currency to the residual category of general intangibles. Article 9 plainly
rejects a one-size-fits-all approach to secured transactions. Indeed, it recognizes
a long list of distinct collateral types that exist separately from the ‘general
intangibles’ catchall, allowing for the operative provisions of Article 9 to be
tailored in ways that make sense for each type of collateral. This is evidenced
by the provisions of Article 9 that only apply to certain types of collateral.”);
see also Martison & Masterson, supra note 204.
205. Tu, supra note 90, at 561.
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accomplish this goal, according to Tu, would be to create a newly defined
type of collateral for virtual currency.206
Creating a new category of collateral solves the problem of perfecting a
security interest in an asset without relying on possession or physical custody
to establish attachment, perfection, and priority. As discussed in Part II, possession and control are two well-established methods of perfection under Article 9 to gain priority over subsequent creditors in the same collateral.207
Depending on the type of collateral involved, a secured creditor can establish
control under Article 9 in several ways: (1) a creditor who is a bank has
control of debtor deposit accounts maintained there; (2) a creditor can enter a
Deposit Account Control Agreement that requires a bank to comply with the
creditor’s instructions regarding disposing funds in the deposit account without the debtor’s further consent; and (3) the creditor has or obtains the “rights
to access or dispose of funds in a deposit account to the exclusion of the
debtor.”208 “By obtaining control in one of these ways, the secured party
effectively obtains the rights of the debtor as the owner of the collateral.”209
As virtual currency is a digital asset, physical possession of the individual coins is not possible.210 Tu argues that a creditor may attach a security
interest in virtual currency with a security agreement.211 A secured party
could establish control of a debtor’s virtual currency collateral by “taking
delivery or physical possession of the debtor’s [virtual currency] wallet”;
“having the debtor transfer the virtual currency to the secured party’s wallet
so that only someone with the secured party’s digital key could access the
collateral”; or “us[ing] an online or mobile wallet operated by a third-party
service provider [such as Coinbase or other virtual currency exchange] to
manage their virtual currency” where the creditor obtains “an authenticated
agreement obligating the third party to comply with the secured party’s instructions regarding the virtual currency without further consent from the
debtor.”212 Thus, Tu maintains that “[v]irtual currency resembles the types of
collateral that can be controlled and appears capable of control in much the
same way” and that “extending control to virtual currency makes sense as it
maintains consistency of treatment across similar collateral types.”213
Tu further posits that adapting the existing Article 9 framework to virtual currency “minimizes potential uncertainty” because “creditors are familiar with the concept of control, so adapting to control over a different type of
206. Tu, supra note 90, at 561.
207. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b).
208. Tu, supra note 90, at 563.
209. Tu, supra note 90, 564.
210. Tu, supra note 90, at 565.
211. Tu, supra note 90, at 568.
212. Tu, supra note 90, at 565–67.
213. Tu, supra note 90, at 568.
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collateral should cause minimal disruption.”214 Tu argues that control could
be a sufficient method for perfecting a security interest in virtual currency
collateral and could also be added to Article 9 as an alternate method of
attachment for virtual currency collateral.215 Tu contends that “extending the
concept of control to virtual currency results in a more effective and efficient
process for obtaining enforceable rights in virtual currency collateral.”216
This is because “[c]ontrol gives secured creditors a clear and unambiguous
way to bypass the uncertainties of determining priority.”217 “Those who wish
to establish priority over virtual collateral must simply: (1) request that the
virtual currency be transferred to them, and (2) determine whether the third
party that maintains the debtor’s virtual currency has executed a control
agreement with the debtor and any other person.”218
Moreover, secured creditors who attached and perfected their interest in
virtual currency collateral would have priority over subsequent creditors who
obtain a security interest in the same collateral.219 Specifically, Tu proposes a
new section addressing priority among conflicting security interests in virtual
currency could be added to Article 9 Section 9-327 to state the following:
(1) a secured creditor with control of virtual currency collateral
has priority over any conflicting security interest by a person without control; (2) priority between conflicting security interests perfected by control rank in order of when the secured party obtained
control; and (3) a method for determining the relative priority between different methods of controlling virtual currency (for example, a secured creditor that obtains control by transfer of the
virtual currency trumps a secured creditor who obtains control via
a tri-party agreement).220
214. Tu, supra note 90, at 568.
215. Tu, supra note 90, at 568–71 (“To achieve consistency as to attachment, virtual
currency should be added to the list of collateral types in [U.C.C. Article 9]
§ 9-203(b)(3)(D), and a new section should be added to demonstrate how a
secured party establishes control of virtual currency. These modifications
would allow for the attachment of a security interest in virtual currency to be
achieved in the same way as similarly situated intangible collateral: either by
an authenticated security agreement that describes the collateral or by control
pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement.”).
216. Tu, supra note 90, at 578.
217. Tu, supra note 90, at 578.
218. Tu, supra note 90, at 578.
219. Tu, supra note 90, at 569, 571–72.
220. Tu, supra note 90, at 571–72 (“By adopting this proposed new section, the
priority rules governing virtual currency would effectively mirror Article 9’s
treatment of similar categories of intangible collateral, and the default priority
rule in Section 9-322 would be supplemented by new priority rules specific to
virtual currency.”).
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Tu contends that defining virtual currency as its own distinct collateral
type is preferable to the alternative of expanding the definitions of existing
defined terms.221 This is because adding a new category of collateral “provides the same substantive benefits that would exist by rolling virtual currency into the definition of investment property” or “money.”222 Tu also
argues this provides for “a broader framework that clearly encompasses different uses of virtual currency (not just investment related) and new types of
virtual currency that may arise in the future.”223
As noted above, the lack of universally employed terminology creates
significant confusion in digital markets because critical terms may be erroneously used interchangeably.224 Current efforts to draft regulation must account for the rapid evolution of innovative technologies. In fairness, virtual
currencies share a variety of attributes with existing financial products. Virtual currencies are, however, a distinct asset class and distinguishable from
conventional and even exotic financial products in many important respects.
In part, early regulatory intervention aimed at applying existing regulation to
virtual currencies stems from a failure to understand the technological and
operational complexities of virtual currencies.
C. Perfecting Virtual Currency Collateral Through Blockchain
Ronald Mann proposes two possible solutions for secured creditors who
want to perfect security interests in virtual currency collateral.225 As indicated
in Part III, the perfection problem may render collateral worthless if the
lender is unable to enforce her claims that she has a perfected security interest.226 Specifically, Mann argues that secured lenders may be unable to identify the entity or individual who holds the public key used to identify the
purchaser of that collateral currency.227 But “even if the lender can identify
the purchaser, location in a remote jurisdiction might make enforcement impractical.”228 Mann contends that one feasible, though imperfect, solution to
this problem is the “quasi-control” method for perfecting security interests in
virtual currency.229
221. Tu, supra note 90, at 562.
222. Tu, supra note 90, at 562.
223. Tu, supra note 90, at 561–62. As an alternate to the above solution, Tu states
the definitions of “investment property” and “money” could be amended and
expanded to explicitly include virtual currency, though this solution would not
be as effective as having virtual currency be its own distinct type of collateral.
224. Johnson, supra note 75.
225. See, e.g., Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47.
226. Tu, supra note 90, at 565–66.
227. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 11).
228. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 7).
229. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 19).
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Under this method, at the time a debtor grants a security interest to a
lender, the debtor transfers the virtual currency as the collateral in the transaction to the appropriate blockchain under the lender’s public key and in the
name of the lender.230 This makes it impossible for the debtor to transfer the
virtual currency without the lender’s private key.231 In this arrangement, the
lender has exclusive control over the debtor’s virtual currency and can
choose when and how to access and dispose of the collateral in the event of
default.232 Further, this “prevent[s] the borrower from evading the lender’s
security interest in [virtual currency] through a transfer to an untraceably
pseudonymous purchaser.”233 Such a transfer into the lender’s name would
likely be accompanied by a security agreement that would give the lender
only the rights of an Article 9 secured creditor, “not the rights of a full owner
of the currency.”234 In the absence of such a security agreement, “Article 9
would limit the lender’s interest . . . to a security interest that the lender could
exercise only in accordance with the procedures (and limitations) that Article
9 prescribes.”235
Mann proposes another solution to the perfection problem that he claims
is better than the quasi-control method: the “smart” contract.236 This is “a
contract that relies on software to execute a transaction in response to prearranged conditions.”237 Specifically, in the crypto-lending context, the smart
contract would “stipulate that the collateral would be transferred to the lender
automatically on the appropriate date if the borrower had not by that date
submitted the requisite evidence of payment.”238 Because such a contract depends on executing software code, it can only work if actions on both sides
can be objectively identified or executed by a computer.239 “In modern con230. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 10–12).
231. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 19–20).
232. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 29).
233. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 19).
234. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 21–22).
235. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 14–15) (“The ‘quasicontrol’ strategy discussed above has salient advantages over simple perfection
by filing in that it gives the lender a more practically efficacious interest in the
promised collateral while at the same time relying on conventional transactional forms. Having said that, it must be acknowledged that it is far from an
elegant solution—obligating borrowers to execute documents designed to have
legal effects remote from their stated terms. It seems ironic that we should
struggle in transactions involving new asset forms based directly in developing
technology to break free of Restoration-Era transactional forms.”).
236. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 23–33).
237. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 23).
238. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 26).
239. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 24).

2018]

(Im)Perfect Regulation

153

templation, which situates smart contracts on the blockchain, the actions of
the contracting parties must be demonstrable to (or executable by) the distributed consensus of the blockchain.”240 Mann contends that collateralizing virtual currency is ideal for smart contracts because transactions on both sides
of the collateralization are suitable for blockchain-based verifications.241
A trusted third party could act as a type of escrow agent to the transaction between the borrower and the lender by assuming responsibility for recording on the appropriate blockchain each payment made or not made.242 If
no payment was made, this could trigger the actions to be taken in the event
of default.243 Mann argues that “implementation of the transactions at the
blockchain level would be less ‘clunky’—more elegant—than the circuitous
use of quasi-control.”244 Mann further argues the smart contract would be
more advantageous than the quasi-control method because it would limit borrower concerns about lender opportunism, meaning the lender being in a position “to dispose of the collateral without the borrower’s consent, or even
over the borrower’s objection.”245 A debtor’s willingness to enter into a smart
contract with a creditor shows the creditor that the debtor is “willing to accept the draconian consequences that would flow from default on a smartlien secured transaction—automated disposition of the collateral at the thencurrent market value.”246
Carla Reyes proposes a “crypto-legal structure” that follows Article 9’s
filing system, wherein a state filing office would implement a type of distributed ledger technology (DLT) protocol for perfecting securities interests in
virtual currency collateral.247 Reyes states that one of the primary functions
of DLT is to provide “a tamper-resistant, distributed, self-executing ledger of
value transfers,” which includes both monetary transfers and “recording
240. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 25).
241. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 25–26) (“Consider
first the borrower’s future obligation: payment of a sum of money. That is
easily settled by having the required payment made in a blockchain-based currency; by submitting the relevant transaction details the borrower could demonstrate to the relevant distributed ledger community that the payment had been
made. Conversely, consider the lender’s side of the transaction: foreclosure on
the collateral in the event of nonpayment. The smart contract need only stipulate that the collateral would be transferred to the lender automatically on the
appropriate date if the borrower had not by that date submitted the requisite
evidence of payment.”).
242. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 29).
243. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47.
244. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 32).
245. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 33).
246. Mann, Reliable Perfection, supra note 47 (manuscript at 36).
247. Reyes, supra note 5, at 419.
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events other than monetary transfers.”248 She contends that to create a cryptolegal structure to function as the existing Article 9 filing system, state filing
offices “could create a Factom chain (or other similar DLT protocol) for use
in recording financing statements.”249 Each financing statement for a creditor’s collateral in a debtor’s virtual currency would be recorded by being
added to the appropriate currency’s blockchain.250 The state filing office
could still index the recordings by the debtor’s name so a search would fetch
all blockchain recordings related to each particular debtor.251 Such a system
would reject any financing statements that do not contain the required information, like the debtor’s name, the creditor’s name, and a description of the
collateral.252 Reyes argues this would an improvement from the current filing
system because “the enforced sequence would not, as is common at filing
offices, incorrectly accept a filing that should be rejected for failure to comply.”253 Thus, “the rules regarding the partial effectiveness of wrongfully accepted filings could be eliminated.”254 She further asserts that such a
system’s programming could be designed to remind the secured party when a
continuance for a financing statement needs to be filed.255 This would “simplify priority analysis and reduce litigation relating to unintentionally lapsed
filings.”256
Reyes suggests that using DLT for such a crypto-legal filing system
would be beneficial because the blockchain would be updated every time a
creditor filed a termination statement or an amendment to an accepted financing statement, and no one could alter or delete the history of the statement.257
This type of DLT-backed audit system could be linked to other online
databases (e.g., the state Division of Motor Vehicle’s electronic database) to
cross-reference or verify debtor name and location information.258 Another
benefit of such a system, Reyes notes, would be that it could eradicate or at
least streamline the Article 9 rules permitting “grace periods to account for
the difficulty in tracing name changes.”259 Reyes acknowledges that such a
proposal would need to be much more detailed to be a fully functional
248. Reyes, supra note 5, at 419.
249. Reyes, supra note 5, at 419.
250. Reyes, supra note 5, at 419.
251. Reyes, supra note 5, at 419.
252. Reyes, supra note 5, at 419.
253. See Reyes, supra note 5, at 420.
254. Reyes, supra note 5, at 420.
255. Reyes, supra note 5, at 420.
256. Reyes, supra note 5, at 420.
257. Reyes, supra note 5, at 420.
258. Reyes, supra note 5, at 420.
259. Reyes, supra note 5, at 420 (citing U.C.C. § 9-507).
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crypto-legal filing system.260 But she proposes the system as a solution to
make secured transactions involving virtual currency as collateral more practical. But this proposal does not solve the problem of volatility and virtual
currency’s ever-fluctuating value that poses a large risk for creditors.
V. EARLY LESSONS IN REGULATING DIGITAL
ASSET MARKETS
Many challenges plague the blockchain protocol and the virtual currency markets built on this technology. Some concerns emerge from the anonymity of transactions; market participants may capitalize on the obscurity of
the market and may utilize virtual currency for deeply disconcerting illicit
and often illegal transactions.261 Other concerns arise when regulators find
themselves unable to effectively monitor and regulate the market.262 The explosive growth of startup companies seeking to lend borrowers cash in exchange for a pledge of virtual currency has engendered significant risk
management concerns.263
Recall that virtual currency is not a tangible, physical asset like government fiat issued in notes or specie. It is also not software or captured in a
single electronic file on a bank custodian’s balance sheet or ledger. Virtual
currency exists on the blockchain. Storage choices for virtual currency are
therefore limited to cold storage systems, cold wallets, or hot wallets.264
Access to storage is controlled by private keys.265 Consider, for example, startups such as Xapo, which physically stores hard drives and computer
servers on which virtual currency information and virtual currency wallets
are stored.266 Xapo permits potential creditors to physically take the drives
and servers.267 As long as the physical equipment is connected to a network,
however, one can quickly transfer the virtual currency funds before the
equipment is physically removed.268
As noted above, the debate regarding the application of Article 9 to
digital assets parallels a debate in capital markets regarding which coins or
260. Reyes, supra note 5, at 420.
261. Clayton, supra note 59; cf. Hughes, supra note 11, at 11–13.
262. Clayton, supra note 59.
263. Gerald Nash, Why Startups are Raising Money with Tokens, MEDIUM (Sept. 5,
2017), https://medium.com/crypto-currently/why-startups-are-raising-moneywith-tokens-ea47ce1c89bb.
264. How to Store Your Bitcoin, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/information/
how-to-store-your-bitcoins/ (last updated Jan. 20, 2018).
265. See Schroeder, supra note 48, at 45.
266. Martinson & Masterson, supra note 203, at 18.
267. Martinson & Masterson, supra note 204, at 18.
268. Martinson & Masterson, supra note 203, at 18.
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tokens have the attributes of “securities” as the term is understood by courts
and regulators.269 A recent SEC report on the application of the Securities
Act of 1933 to initial coin offerings strongly discourages financial market
participants from engineering assets that share attributes with financial arrangements that may be deemed “securities.”270
The DAO Report examines a capital raising venture launched by an
automated investment fund or decentralized autonomous organization
(DAO).271 The DAO entered into a “funding phase” where investors sent
Ether to the DAO’s account using the Ethereum platform. Based on the DAO
structure, early investors received different benefits than later investors.272
The DAO raised approximately $150 million in an initial coin offering (ICO)
of Ethereum tokens which it then converted into DAO tokens.273 Developers
often hold ICOs after releasing a white paper detailing their idea for a future
product to garner investors.274 However, not long after launching its ICO and
prior to funding any projects, in June 2016, the DAO was subject to a cyberattack wherein a hacker stole approximately one-third of its assets.275
269. Carol Goforth, The Lawyer’s Cryptionary: A Resource for Talking to Clients
about Crypto-Transactions, 41 CAMPBELL L. REV. 47, 86 (2019); see also Nate
Crosser, Initial Coin Offerings as Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility
Tokens Securities?, 67 KAN. L. REV. 379, 390 (2018) (“ICOs are the online
sale of blockchain tokens. Tokens are given in exchange for relatively liquid
cryptocurrency (like Bitcoin) or fiat currency in an ICO to fund the development of a distributed ledger project. . . . Tokens come with various rights and
features and may or may not purport to confer any actual ownership interest or
voting power in an organization.”).
270. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: The DAO, Release No. 81207, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (July 25,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf (“An investment contract is an investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others.”); see also SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004).
271. Andrew Tar, SEC Ruling on the DAO and ICO, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH
(July 27, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/explained/sec-ruling-on-the-daoand-ico-explained.
272. Usha Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming).
273. Michael Mendelson, From Initial Coin Offerings to Security Tokens: A U.S.
Federal Securities Law Analysis, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 52, 69 (2019); Rodrigues, supra note 272 (“The DAO’s token creation code was open source code,
where anyone could copy or modify the original code, and it was written by the
Slock.it team”).
274. See Nareg Essaghoolian, Initial Coin Offerings: Emerging Technology’s Fundraising Innovation, 66 UCLA L. REV. (2019).
275. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: The DAO, Release No. 81207, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (July 25,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf.
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Parallel to the construction of the U.C.C., Section 2 of the Securities Act
of 1933, the defined terms, does not include digital assets or cryptocurrency
among the enumerated classes of assets to which the statute applies. However, Congress included among the enumerated terms a catchall phrase “investment contract” to enable regulators to apply federal securities laws to
financial arrangements even if the arrangements were not listed as types of
securities. Thus, a financial arrangement might be considered a “security” if
the economic realities of the transaction reflect the common attributes of any
of the classes of “securities” expressly enumerated in Section 2. As the Court
explained in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. and subsequent precedent, “[t]he
‘touchstone’ of an investment contract ‘is the presence of an investment in a
common venture premised ona reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.’ ”276 The analysis values substance over form.
Applying this analysis in the context of the DAO, the SEC concluded
that DAO investors purchased securities and that the promoters of the offering failed to register the securities with the SEC in advance of sales as required by Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 and they violated federal
securities laws. While the SEC’s analysis in the DAO Report illustrates a
path for regulating coin offerings under federal securities laws, critics immediately raised questions regarding how the rule might apply with such a great
diversity of tokens. Similar to the debate regarding the application of the
U.C.C., many still argue that amending the definition of “security” may offer
a more useful approach.
The current secured transactions regime under Article 9 leaves many
operational questions unanswered. A secured lender’s uncertainty as to the
perfection and continuation of a security interest increases transaction costs
and inefficiencies.277 This likely increases lending rates for secured transactions involving virtual currency as collateral.278 As Bob Lawless suggests,
virtual currency threatens to unravel the entire enterprise of secured
transactions.279
VI. CONCLUSION
The arrival of virtual currencies has deeply impacted financial markets
and will influence the shape of market activities for many years to come. The
introduction of this new technology in financial markets, however, has challenged existing institutional and regulatory structures. As discussed in Parts I

276. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); see also United Housing
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
277. McJohn & McJohn, supra note 183, at 19.
278. McJohn & McJohn, supra note 183, at 15–19.
279. Lawless, supra note 24.
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and II, virtual currencies raise a significant number of regulatory issues.280
While the existing regulatory framework—U.C.C. Article 9 in the context of
secured lending—offers a pathway for attempting to regulate virtual currencies, relying on antiquated notions of financial products and regulations that
lack the flexibility to address innovations in the markets will fail to offer a
sustainable solution. Surely, subsequent contributions comparing early entrants in the regulatory market will illuminate the approaches adopted by
FinCEN, the bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury responsible for
oversight of money services businesses, or the Internal Revenue Service.
Each of these regulators has taken important steps toward expanding existing
regulation in the virtual currency markets. While we may not yet have answers to many questions regarding how to structure regulation, a valuable
literature encouraging an important discussion has emerged, enabling scholars, market participants, and regulators to begin to weigh the costs and benefits of various approaches.

280. McJohn & McJohn, supra note 183.

